Struggles of Security in US Foreign Drug Policy Towards Andean Countries

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"There are not only struggles of security among nations, but also struggles of security among notions."[1]

This phrase - although mentioned by his author in a different context - helps to describe the main problems in US foreign drug policy towards Andean countries. First, there are security struggles among "nations." Instead of promoting cooperative efforts to deal with transnational problems, US foreign drug policies place Andean nations in a confrontational situation with the United States and by the same token emphasise unilateral strategies and leverage over the region. Second, there are struggles among "notions" of security. US policymakers have carried out the "*securitization*"[2] of the drug problem under the mainstream Realist notion of "national security," which prevails in the field of International Relations. Such a securitisation emphasises the application of state-centred policies and military means to face drug trafficking and the complex problems related to it, while excluding from the notion of security the economic and social vulnerabilities faced especially within the rural Andean zones where coca is grown.

The purpose of this paper is both to note the harmful consequences that a securitisation under the banner of "national security" yields in this policy area and to underline the need to pursue a wider securitisation that tackle Andean countries' drug problems under lenses alternative to the Realist approach. In this regard, the first section briefly describes US drug policies directed at Andean countries. The second section discusses some of the flaws in the design and application of these policies. Based in part upon research by Bagley[3] and Gonzales[4] who have outlined the correspondence between

1 Ronnie Lipschtuz, On Security, (Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 10.
2 Securitisation refers to the act of presenting an issue in security terms. That is, to frame an issue as an existentially threatening development that calls for extraordinary measures beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics. See Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and J. Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 25-26. I develop more about this concept in section II of the present paper.
3 In 1988 Bruce Bagley set the argument that the realist framework was guiding US foreign drug policy. See " US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Fall 1988. Later he

the premises of the Realist approach and the standards established in US foreign drug policy,[5] I analyse the US process of certification. I point out that its application has accentuated the struggles of security between the US and Andean countries. Also, I refer to the effects of the restricted notion of security on the regulation of the alternative development programmes and the trade preferences granted by the US to the Andean countries producers of coca. The third section suggests the concrete lessons that can be drawn from critical approaches in the field of international relations for the modification of current US foreign drug policies towards Andean countries. In this regard I underline the importance of trade, aid, and development as related venues to face the economic and social problems affecting Andean rural areas and improve counter-narcotic efforts in this region.

I.- Overview of US foreign drug policies towards Andean countries

For the purpose of explanation, the various regulations constituting this policy area may be classified into two: those that establish policies of control and those that establish policies of aid. In the former, there is the certification process in effect since 1986 (under section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) that requires the President of the United States to submit to Congress an annual determination of the counter-narcotic cooperation of major narcotic-producing and narcotic-transiting countries. If a nation

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developed this argument in Bruce Bagley, and Juan Totaklian, "Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure of U.S. Latin American Drug Policies" in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz and Augusto Varas, Ed. The United States and Latin America in the 1990s : Beyond the cold war, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

4 Guadalupe Gonzales, "Regimen Internacional y Politicas Nacionales de Control de Drogas: Un analisis comparado de Mexico y Colombia." In Regionalismo y Poder en America: los Limites del Neorrealismo, (Mexico: Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas - CIDE- , 1996)

5 The works of Bagley and Gonzales develop the argument that the US is using a realist framework especially in the formulation of the process of certification and in the provision of military aid to combat narcotraffic in the Andean region. Here I extend their analysis to other schemes included in this policy area related to the promotion of aid and development. Due to limited space in the present paper I mention but do not analyse the military aid issue, a paramount but complex problem that requires to be scrutinised in a comprehensive and detailed way. Nonetheless, it is worth noting two aspects in this regard. First, like the process of certification, the provision of military aid has also had unintended consequences with devastating effects in the fight against narcotraffic. Furthermore, it has contributed to human rights violations in the Andean rural areas. Abundant literature tackles the problems related to the military aid issue. See especially the "Washington Office of Latin America (WOLA) Drug War Monitor." Second, the inclusion of military aid in US foreign drug policy might respond not only to the influence of the IR realist approach in this policy area, but also to other interests and interactions. For instance, the self-interest of the "security industry" (state agencies included, especially those in the defense area which after the end of the Cold War have been assigned new tasks and their increasing budgets have been legitimized by the proclaimed need to counter new external threats). In this regard see for instance Glen Segell, "The narcotics war and civil-military relations", paper presented at the International Studies Association conference, 14-18 March, 2000, Los Angeles.

fails to meet either of the requirements it is "decertified" and the US may reduce its aid and oppose the approval of multilateral loans to that nation. In the second group, there are the alternative development programs (ADPs) and the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), presently known as ATPEA. ADPs are designed to assist Andean nations to promote legal activities alternative to the production of coca. With that same purpose, ATPEA authorises the President of the US to proclaim duty-free or duty reductions for eligible imported goods from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Regarding "military aid," although in its budgetary reports the US places that as part of its "economic assistance to the Andean region," such a particular aid is clearly a strategy of control. Through military aid the US provides technical and logistical support to Andean military and police forces for the interception of drug-traffickers and the implementation of the forced programmes of eradication of drug crops in the Andean nations.

I have stated that this classification of policies of control and aid is only for the purpose of explanation because although each of these policies is supposed to tackle a specific aspect of the illegal drug problem, in practice both are related. As discussed in the following sections, in the line of a restricted securitisation of the drug problem US policymakers have emphasised the application of the schemes of control in a way that has had a detrimental effect on the objectives foreseen on the policies of aid.

II.- The "securitization" of the drug problem in US foreign drug policy

Wæver warns that although the security label may be useful to signal danger and set priorities, when a problem is "securitized" there is the risk of addressing it in particular ways: threat, defence, and state-centred solutions.[6] Such a limited "securitization" leads to the application of the traditional logic of military behavior to non-military problems.[7] Unfortunately, the securitisation of the drug problem has been carried out in this way. As a result, in addition to the drug problem, its securitisation under the banner of "national security" proper of the realist approach, is also problematic and causes various flaws in US foreign drug policy.

6 Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization." In Ronnie Lipschtuz, On Security, p. 25
7 Ibid

How a problem is defined or represented in the minds of decision-makers can be expected to influence how they choose to respond to that problem.[8] As claimed by critics of realism that recognise the interplay between theory and practice, and knowledge and power, the narrow terms of a realist dominated IR discipline have framed the understanding of the "world out there" and determined the analytical politico–strategic responses to it.[9] A lengthy exploration of the process through which theory (in this case IR realism) has influenced US policy makers concretely in the formulation of foreign drug policy, goes beyond the scope of the present paper.[10] Not only it is difficult to establish the detailed process through which policymakers directly avail themselves of scholarship to formulate policy responses, but also as noted by George, the policymaking process is often driven by internal and international political forces that may limit the impact of knowledge provided by scholarship.[11] Nonetheless, the remarkable coincidences between the guidelines and objectives established in US foreign drug policy and the IR realist premises denote the importance attributed by policymakers to realism and to the practice of military strategies in the line of that approach.

Within the realist framework "national security" is defined as the imperative of defending the state (primarily its territory) against external dangers, by increasing (mainly military) power capabilities.[12] Especially since 1968 when the administration of President Nixon made the first US public declaration of a "War on Drugs," policymakers have identified drug-trafficking as a threat to national security – under the same terms defined by realism - and have designed policies that emphasise military and state-

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8 Keith Shimko, "Foreign Policy Metaphors: Falling Dominoes and Drug Wars," in Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick Haney, Eds. Foreign Policy Analysis Continuity and Change in its Second Generation, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1995), p. 82.

9 Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations, (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner and Macmillan's, 1994), p.224

10 About the detailed process through which theory may influence policymaking see Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 1993). George utilises case studies of recent US foreign policy events to determine what kind of scholarly knowledge was fundamental to the decisions made by policymakers. Acknowledging that realism and structural realism do not constitute a theory of foreign policy, George observes that often US foreign policies are based on an inaccurate image of the adversary and policymakers operate with inadequate conceptual and generic knowledge of strategies they employ in conducting foreign policy.

11 Ibid

12 Traditional realism stresses Morgenthau's notion that the state is the most important actor in world politics and that it is necessary to defend the national interest in terms of power. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973), pp. 4 – 15. For structural realism the international system is an anarchic state system whose main characteristic is the competition for security based upon (primarily military) power. See Ken Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security, 25 (2000) pp. 5-41

centered solutions.[13] Both the increasing funding for military aid and the inclusion in 1986 of the certification process in US foreign drug policy, denote the pervasive continuation (for more than three decades) of such an approach in this policy area.[14]

Although in 1989 President Bush launched the Andean Initiative incorporating regulations that supported policies of aid as part of US foreign drug policy towards Andean nations, this initiative did not imply a significant change regarding the security framework prevailing in this policy area.[15] In 1996 President Clinton included "fighting against drug-trafficking" as one of the national security issues in his National Security Strategy Statement to Congress and in July 2000 approved "Plan Colombia" to support anti-narcotics efforts in the Andean region. Through military and police aid this program focused on security and law enforcement at the expense of development and institutional reform.[16] During the two terms of President Clinton, the governments of the Andean countries requested on various opportunities that the US end the certification process.

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13 It is worth briefly noting the background of these developments. Not only the premises established in specific US foreign drug policy regulations, but also peculiar facts proper of the context in which those regulations were formulated are evidence of the influence of IR realism in the US policymaking community. To begin with, the "War on Drugs" was declared as such in the middle of the Cold War during which international politics strongly mirrored the practice of deterrence and counterbalances supported by the IR realist approach. Particularly interesting is also the academic background of two of the best known American academics who held high positions in the US foreign policy establishment in the 1970s: Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. As commented by Viotti, there is not mere coincidence that both policymakers are both self- professed realists: "The Realist as academic speaks much the same language as the Realist as statesman: power, force, national interest …" in Paul Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory, (New York, Macmillan, 1987) p. 61. In 1971 when President Nixon took a crucial step toward militarisation by proclaiming drug trafficking a national security threat, Kissinger was National Security adviser. In 1974 Brzezinski was adviser on foreign affairs and in 1976 was appointed as Carter's National Security adviser. Furthermore, as noted by Shimko, during the Bush administration (1989-1993) Defense Secretary Richard Cheney identified drugs as a "direct threat to the role for US forces in fighting the drug war abroad." A July 1989 National Security Council Report urged an expansion of the role of the US military in the Andean countries and did not rule out the use of combat forces in the future. See Keith Shimko, "Foreign Policy Metaphors: Falling Dominoes and Drug Wars." In Laura Neack, et. al. Foreign Policy Analysis Change in its Second Generation, pp 81-82

14 United States annual foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean fell from $1.7 billion in 1986 to $650 million in 1996. In contrast, narcotics related assistance to that region more than doubled during the same period, rising from $60 million to $134 million per year. See Task Force Report, Rethinking International Drug Control: New Directions for U.S. Policy, (Council on Foreign Relations,1997) p. 10

15 Indeed, as pointed by The Task Force Report, the US urged Latin American governments to involve their armed forces in drug control. Thus, although US military members had been involved in training, equipping, and transporting host countries' anti-narcotics forces since the early 1980s, the Andean strategy opened the door to a dramatic expansion of this role and to a significant deployment of US assistance to police and military forces in the region. For instance, since the launching of the Andean Initiative until 1996 the US provided the Colombian armed forces and police with more than $500 million in drug control equipment, including helicopters, utility vehicles, planes, and weapons. See Council on Foreign Relations, Rethinking International Drug Control, pp. 38-42

16 For instance, Plan Colombia's funding (supplemental appropriation, fiscal year 2000) for the State Department was of $645 millions (from which only $3 millions were directed to alternative development) while funding for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was a total of $123. See detailed information in Center for International Policy, http://ciponline.org/colombia/10929.pdf. Likewise, as noted by the Latin American Working Group (LAWG) US policy towards Colombia "is pouring fuel on the fire." Between 1999-2002, the United States gave

However, this remained even after the US drug czar Barry MacCaffrey had acknowledged many of its flaws.[17]

In 2000, President George W. Bush launched the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI). According to the State Department Briefing issued on May 16, 2001 the ARI covered the three "Ds:" democracy, development, and drugs, and intended to concentrate on addressing the major problems and threats affecting the Andean region. In fact, the ARI made some adjustments to the primarily militaristic approach of Plan Colombia adding positive funding for development programs in Andean nations. Nonetheless, the US has continued investing heavily in training, arms (especially for the Colombian Army's counter-narcotics troops and Colombian National Police), and support for forced eradication programs in the Andean region.[18] Regarding the annual certification process, in December 2001,[19] Congress enacted in a temporary waiver to the drug certification requirements for FY2002, and in September 2002 extended it to FY2003.[20] These waivers, as well as the inclusion of positive funding for development programmes, constitute an important step towards the modification of current legislation. Yet they are temporary suspensions. Furthermore, as long as the realist state-centred notion of security continues to dominate the US foreign drug policy, there is the risk that these incipient efforts will be truncated,[21] and as explained below, that this policy area will continue reproducing struggles of security among nations and notions.

Colombia $2.04 billion, of which 83% has gone to Colombia's military and police. http://www.lawg.org/countries/colombia/intro.htm

17 On July 16 1997, an amendment to the fiscal 1998 foreign aid spending bill, which would have suspended the certification process, was rejected by the U.S. Senate. The amendment was sponsored by Senators Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) and John McCain (R-AZ), and backed by White House national security adviser Samuel R. Berger, and General Barry R. McCaffrey, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. See Thomas W. Lippman, "Senate Rejects Plan to Stop Rating Countries' Anti-Drug Cooperation," Washington Post, July 17, 1997, p. A8.

18 For instance, in the ARI regional package, support for military operations overshadowed assistance for democracy strengthening, economic development, and other non-military programs. See Gina Amatangelo, "Andean Regional Initiative: A Policy Fated to Fail," Foreign Policy In Focus, 17(2001) http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol6/v6n17drugmil.html.

19 The Narcotics Certification Process was modified as a result of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2002-2003, signed into law on September 30, 2002. http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/fs/17010.htm retrieved on April 19, 2004.

20 Legislation on "International Drug Control Certification Procedures" in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of September 2002. Ibid

21 Besides the suspension of the annual unilateral drug certification procedure for a period of 2 years, the new legislation recommends the US government to develop a multilateral strategy. Nonetheless, given the lack of support by prominent members of the Washington establishment with respect to prior multilateral initiatives, it is difficult to assure the US support for a multilateral option that could replace the unilateral certification process. In fact, under the auspices of the Organisation of American States (OAS) a Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) was approved in 1998 and its first report was released on January 2001. As noted by Gamarra, members of Congress and of the Bush administration criticised this mechanism for having just recommendations and no sanctions. "Although there appears to

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Der Derian, Campbell, Shapiro and George, among other scholars, point out that in international relations, the US has constructed itself and other nations' identities within the static confines of a realist security discourse bounded to notions of sovereign self and threatening "other."[22] The overemphasis on sending military aid to combat drug-trafficking in the Andean nations' territory, and the application for more than a decade of the unilateral certification process, denote that externalisation of danger, the perception that threats related to the drug problem come from abroad.

Such a perception not only reinforces the identification the US has made of itself as a victim of the drug trade, and of the drug problem as a national security issue. It also leaves aside the recognition that the US might also be an exporter of danger to the Andean nations, and thus, an exporter of insecurity abroad. In fact, the increasing international demand for drugs - in which the US plays a leading role - constitutes a serious danger for Andean nations. This demand is an incentive for the expansion of drug-trafficking in the Andean region, for the crime related to it, and for the various social and economic problems derived from the increasing illegal narcotics trade.[23] Furthermore, not only US demand for drugs but also US foreign drug policies themselves cause problems in the Andean region. As noted by countless reports from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the provision of US military aid is increasing the

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be an emerging consensus on the limits of its usefulness, certification has powerful supporters in the US Congress who will do whatever it takes to make sure that it remains in place." See Eduardo A. Gamarra, "The Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism: Is Evaluation of Anti-Drug Efforts Sufficient?, Canadian Foundation for the Americas, Policy Paper, April 2001

22 See Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics, p. 208; David Campbell, Writing Security, United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) p. 171

23 However, it is important to mention two issues in this regard. First, although demand for drugs nourishes supply, the other way around might be possible as some analysts and especially members of the US government affirm. Second, it cannot be denied that demand for drugs is also a problem within the Latin American region. Indeed according to a CICAD report, demand has risen in all countries of the region. See CIDAD (Comision Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas/ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission), Evaluation of Progress in Drug Control. Hemispheric Report 1999-2000, (Washington, D.C., December, 2000). Nonetheless, as noted by various analyses that have studied the illegal drug chain production and the formation of price in this regard, due to the lucrative US market, its demand for illegal drugs plays a leading role in accelerating supply.

militarisation of rural areas and human rights violations, creating a serious risk for fragile Andean democracies that has a negative affect on their anti-narcotics efforts.[24]

With respect to the certification process, two interrelated perceptions based on the realist approach are implicit. First, that America's drug problem is constituted by foreign countries' deliberate refusal to cooperate. Second, that without external pressure on targeted countries these will not increase their counter-drug efforts. The former is grounded in the realist focus on nation-states as the main actors in international politics, and discounts the fact that domestic pressures may lead to outcomes other than compliance.[25] The latter as noted by Bagley, is based on the realist premise that emphasises the full range of national power resources to obtain desired responses from otherwise "uncooperative" states.[26] These realist perceptions that externalise danger are flawed with respect to the drug problem.

As Flynn[27] puts it, the persistence of the illegal drug trade provides evidence of two important facts: one, that the international system is not simply the sum of its states, and two, of the growing capacity of non-state actors to act locally and globally without the traditional prerogatives of nation-states. In fact, drug trafficking requires the participation of various sub-national and transnational actors. Among the former, there are the peasants dedicated to growing illicit drugs. Due to the lack of legal economic opportunities in Andean rural zones, peasants see this activity as the most viable developmental path.[28] The transnational actors are the trafficking organisations involved with the illegal drug trade – narcotraffic – that include in their chain production individuals and businesses expanding their access into overseas markets. These trafficking organisations have accumulated threatening levels of wealth, weaponry and

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24 As mentioned earlier, see among others, especially the reports of the Washington Office on drugs Latin America (WOLA), and the Washington-based Latin America Working Group (LAWG).

25 Richard Friman, "Societal Influence and the International Drug Trade." In David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson, Eds. The Limits of State Autonomy Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formation, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) p. 103

26 See Bruce Bagley, and Juan Totaklian, "Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure of U.S. Latin American Drug Policies" in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz and Augusto Varas, The United States and Latin America in the 1990s : Beyond the cold war

27 Stephen E. Flynn, "Drug Trafficking, the International System, and Decision Making Constraints: A Policy-Making Simulation", International Studies Perspectives, 1 (2000), p. 47. See also from the same author "The Global Drug Trade Versus the Nation State: Why the Thugs are Winning." In M. Cusimano Ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda, (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1999) pp. 44-66

28 A more ample explanation about peasants' dependence on the drug industry is described on page 12-17 of this paper.

power that permit them to attract, extort, and corrupt state and non-state actors.[29] Narcotraffickers attract peasants to the production of illegal drugs through the provision of goods and services in scarce supply in Andean rural areas. Furthermore, since narcotraffic also finances other transnational crime practices such as black market arms trafficking,[30] this enhances their capability to corrupt or intimidate police and judicial authorities, and increase violence and criminal activity throughout the hemisphere. Thus, the process of certification narrowly focused on the state puts an excessive burden on Andean countries which have to respond to the US for crimes executed by non-state transnational criminal actors.

As explained by Gonzales,[31] another major flaw in US foreign drug policy is the assumption that the governments submitted to the process of certification design and implement their drug policies only because of the pressure of the threats of sanctions. Given the powerful position of the US in the region, it cannot be denied that US pressure plays a role, especially regarding deadlines and guidelines in the application of drug policies. Nonetheless, to assume that unless the threats imposed by the process of certification Andean governments would not be involved in anti-narcotics efforts is not correct. As research in this regard notes, in many instances domestic concerns - such as the protection of their citizens, and the fight against crime related to drug trafficking - are precisely the ones that make Andean governments double their counter-narcotic efforts.[32] The so-called supplier nations are conscious of the need to fight against drug-trafficking and try to do this for the sake of their internal security and not just as a reaction to the pressure exercised by the US.

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29 As noted by Calvani, the revenues of the global trade in illegal narcotics rivals the revenues of the largest multinational companies and serves a market of 200 million people in a market worth around US$400 billion, giving rise to entities that threaten states and command private armies. S. Calvani, "Eastern Horizons", UN International Drug Control Programme, #1, March 3, 2000

30 See Peter Reuter and Carol Petrie, Ed., Transnational Organized Crime, Summary of a Workshop,(Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1999)

31 Guadalupe Gonzales, "Regimen Internacional y Politicas Nacionales de Control de Drogas: Un analisis comparado de Mexico y Colombia." In Regionalismo y Poder en America: los Limites del Neorrealismo, p. 354

32 For instance, Gonzales refers to the Colombian case in which political imperatives - given the negative consequences that drug-trafficking has on this country's internal security- have motivated various Colombian administrations to enforce stronger anti-narcotics policies. In addition to Gonzales' work, see Maria Cecilia Toro "Unilateralism and Bilateralism," in Peter Smith Ed., Drug Policy in the Americas, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) pp. 314-321. Toro explains that although Latin American governments tend to publicly evaluate their drug control programs referring to the need to collaborate with the US government, in fact their unilateral actions to fight drugs are designed to pursue domestic concerns such as the protection of their citizens and the fight against crime related to drug trafficking.

Moreover, the fact that the US has granted certifications does not necessarily mean that the certification process is an effective strategy of control that makes governments abide with US counter-drug objectives. In many cases the US, using a double standard has certified countries as being cooperative based not on their counter-drug efforts, but on US strategic considerations.[33] By the same token, countries that were effectively cooperating with the US were decertified because at the time of the evaluation process they were considered of less importance for US interests. The de-certification of Colombia by the US in the years 1996 and 1997 is a case in point.[34] Consequently, the characterisation of the US certification process by US policymakers as a necessary and compelling strategy of control is exaggerated.[35]

In sum, there is an evident contradiction between the reality of the Andean nations with respect to the illegal drug trade and the realist perception of "dangerous other" implicit in the policies of control included in US foreign drug policy. Those perceptions locate the US and Andean nations in a conflicting position. The continuous application of policies of control reinforces such a conflict, worsening the security struggles among these nations linked by a narcotics problem.

Struggles of "notions" of security in US foreign drug policy

In the field of international relations, realism privileges the state (and specifically powerful states) as the main deserving referent of security and precludes the analysis of security experienced by individuals, groups, and communities at the sub-state level.[36] As

33 While Mexico has been fully certified each year by the Executive, congressional resolutions to disapprove Mexico's certification were introduced in 1987, 1988, 1997, 1998, and 1999, and congressional criticisms of Mexico's certifications were voiced in many years. For more detail, see K. Larry Storrs, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: Congressional Action, 1986-2001, (Washington D.C.: CRS Report 98-174)

34 In March 1997 Colombia was decertified for the second consecutive year despite the fact that Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, Dennis Haster (R-IL) had previously recognised that Colombia had done even more to fight drug trafficking than Mexico. The New York Times, February 26, 1997.

35 See in this regard the observations made by Coletta Youngers, "Drug Decertification: The Process Has Become an Annual Charade", March 27, 1999, http://www.converge.org.nz/lac/articles/news990327a.htm. Also, Rensselaer Lee and Raphael Perl, Congressional Research Service, "Drug Control: International Policy and Options", Almanac of Policy Issues, Updated October 16, 2002, http://www.policyalmanac.org/crime/archive/crs_drug_control_international.shtlm.

36 Lloyd Pettiford and Melissa Curley, Changing Security Agendas and the Third World, (New York: Pinter, 1999) p. 62.

such, realism fails to identify the most pressing concerns especially in the world's poorer states where people's main security concern is clearly how to survive until tomorrow.[37]

Although during the early 1990s certain policies of aid were introduced as part of US foreign drug policy with the purpose of tackling some of the economic problems affecting peasant producers of illegal drugs in the Andean rural region, US policymakers do not consider these problems as security issues. What is worse, the fact that the persistence of economic and social vulnerabilities affecting the people from these rural zones constitutes a matter of [in]security not only for this people but also for Andean nations and the US as well is overlooked. As a result, more emphasis has been given to the application of policies of control. Furthermore, in various aspects that application has obstructed the objectives the policies of aid were supposed to promote.

Peasants in the Andean rural areas where coca is produced face extreme poverty, increasing food deficits, rural unemployment, and underemployment. Infrastructure problems such as the lack of roads and transportation facilities, unavailability of reasonable credits, and expensive inputs, among others, limit the access of peasants to legal viable economic opportunities. In contrast, the illegal drug industry offers peasants opportunities the state and legal crops do not. Rural labourers earn more working in the drug industry than by growing legal crops, and in some cases there is simply no other option. The lack of jobs in Andean rural areas forces many peasants to leave their homelands and move to zones where coca is already produced; or to farm distant zones where, under the orders of drug-traffickers, coca is about to be produced. Besides job opportunities, the drug-traffickers offer "solutions" to the serious problems of farm-to-market infrastructure legal crops face. Peasants working for the illegal drug industry do not have to worry about inputs, transportation, and distribution. Drug-traffickers send their "agents" directly to the peasants' villages to provide inputs and to collect the final product: the coca leaves or cocaine.

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37 See Ken Booth, New Thinking about Strategy and International Security, (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991). Also see the work of Brian Job (1992). With respect to the traditional "security dilemma" framework (which assumes threats come from outside boundaries) Job notes the need for an alternative one that can provide a better analytical handle on the security of peoples in the Third World where states are preoccupied with internal rather than external security. He proposes the concept "insecurity dilemma" as a more comprehensive framework to understand the insecurities faced by individuals and social groups.

Between becoming part of illegal narcotics production and facing unemployment and increased poverty, peasants choose the former. Although drug production provides some income to the peasants, the drug traffickers are the ones that profit most from the drug trade.[38] Peasants do not become rich and their communities do not achieve economic development either. Instead, what narcotics production promotes is particular forms of "coca" not necessarily related to consumption but mainly to the creation of social and cultural problems that worsen the already devastated economic situation in Andean rural areas.

The illegal drug industry recruits not only peasants growers of coca, but also inhabitants of the towns located close to the coca fields to work in the transportation of crops, the processing of cocaine, and in additional services required by drug traffickers at the beginning of the production chain. The so-called "coca-towns" become dangerously "dependent" on drug capital in two ways. First, they depend on illegal capital and outside markets.[39] As described by Narvaez,[40] that dependence is indeed another form of slavery. Since coca money provides for everything in the peasants' villages, when for some reason coca buyers do not come there is total chaos. Second, an artificial infrastructure created by drug-trafficking promotes a culture of "consumerism" imported by the inhabitants of the coca-towns.[41] Although these towns lack basic infrastructure (paved streets, drinking water, schools, and health services that should have been provided by the state but which do not exist), their inhabitants, because they are linked to drug-trafficking have access to superfluous goods such as bars, discotheques, and car and stereo dealerships.[42] The fast

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38 Various specialized reports acknowledge this issue. The Latin American Working Group reports that only about 0.5% of the US $1million that users may pay for a kilogram of cocaine goes to the growers of the main raw material.
39 For instance, Mac Gregor notes that in the region of Chapare (Bolivia) and in the areas of the Yungas, the illegal trade of coca has pulled the prices of other products with it, and there has been an increase in land prices and speculation. However, he points out, the most significant impacts are that the settlers are increasingly dependent on cocaine trafficking capital, and that the number of growers involved in processing cocaine sulphate is rising daily. Felipe Mac Gregor, Ed. Coca and Cocaine and Andean Perspective, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993), pp. 6-14
40 Otherwise noted, the description of the peculiar drug dependency in Andean rural areas is drawn upon the research elaborated by Luis Narvaez, "Responding to the Illegal Drugs Trade: In Search of Just and Effective Solutions", papers from a seminar organised by the Catholic Institute of International Relations Report, 1995. (London : Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1996) Regarding the various problems caused by the drug problem it is also important to read the reports by the Transnational Institute, concretely those concerning Drug and Democracy. http://www.tni.org/drugs/ungass/index.htm
41 Narvaez, "Responding to the Illegal Drugs Trade", p. 11
42 For a detailed description of the distorting impact and fake modernisation caused by narcotraffick in the so-called "coca boomtowns" see Lee W. Renseelaer, The White Labyrinth, (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1991) and Patrick Clawson and Lee W. Renseelaer, The Andean Cocaine Industry,(New York: St. Martin Press, 1996)

and easy economic "prosperity" offered by drug-trafficking creates a false wealth or fake modernisation that distorts the values and identities of entire communities.[43] This has a destructive effect for future generations. Especially in remote rural areas, drug traffickers – and in Colombia and Peru, drug traffickers and guerrilla bosses - become the only models of socialisation for young people.[44]

Furthermore, NGOs specialists on environmental issues have argued that coca growing and the processing of cocaine not only have detrimental effects on the environment[45] it may also cause the loss of specialised sustainable agricultural techniques, a shift to mono-agriculture, bio-diversity loss, and a potential loss of cultural eco-knowledge. In fact, the high demand for coca crops and the obstacles for developing legal products is in some cases leading the shift of agricultural sectors to mono-cropping of coca. Since specialised sustainable agricultural techniques in Andean rural areas are often transferred from one generation to another through word of mouth and experience,[46] the emphasis on coca mono-cropping may cause the loss of eco-knowledge in the region.[47] The caring relationship with the environment that inhabitants of Andean rural areas have preserved for centuries might be on its way of extinction.[48]

The structural violence mentioned above caused by the devastating economic situation in Andean rural areas where coca is produced is accentuated by the violence associated with the presence of antagonistic groups that had turned these areas into war zones. Besides the criminal violence associated with narcotraffic, there is the presence of armed groups in the rural areas of Colombia and Peru,[49] and in the case of Colombia there are

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43 Coca buyers arrive into the villages driving modern cars, wearing gold jewelry and expensive clothes, and with dollars at hand that allow them to pay not only for the coca production but also for alcohol consumption and additional "services" in bars and discotheques.

44 Narvaez, "Responding to the Illegal Drugs Trade", p. 11. Narvaez also notes that in Remolinos, a little town in Colombia where 85% of the people is engaged in coca cultivation, more than one thousand youngsters collect the coca leaf crops every two months. When the coca crop is ripe the few schools empty because parents need their children for the leaf picking.

45 The environmental destruction covers a wide range of problems including pesticide use, chemical dumping, deforestation, soil erosion, and water pollution. The use of large quantities of chemicals (pesticides, weed killers, and fertilizers) affects the soil, and contaminates waterways. After the use of huge amounts of chemicals the coca laboratories or processing plants simply dumped those onto the ground, or directly into rivers. See Carl Scott and Deborah M. Ullmer, "Coca Trade and Land Use Changes," TED Case Studies, 1 (1992), Case # 16. http://www.american.edu/TED/coca.htm

46 This type of knowledge is shared through extensive apprenticeships taking many years.

47 Carl Scott and Deborah M. Ullmer, "Coca Trade and Land Use Changes."

48 Ibid

49 In Colombia, it is especially detrimental the situation caused by the attacks from FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (National Liberation Army). In Peru the declining power of the Sendero Luminoso

also right wing paramilitary groups called "Self Defense Forces."[50] The paramilitary forces organise attacks mainly against the insurgents. The presence of narcotraffickers and insurgents attracts the deployment by Andean governments of military and police forces in the region (supported and financed by the US). In the middle of the fire there are the peasants that have to face their own battle to survive amidst conditions of extreme poverty and lack of legal viable opportunities.

These economic and social vulnerabilities make the life of the people living in Andean rural areas, particularly the peasants, more insecure. The permanence of these vulnerabilities reinforces the production of illegal crops and of cocaine, creating the optimal framework for accelerating drug-trafficker's empowerment in the rural areas and thus, their ability to destabilise Andean nations. As a result, there is more production and export of drugs to the US. Such a situation, added to the fact that drug trade in the Andean region is encouraged mainly by the US demand for cocaine, underline the interdependence that exists between the US and Andean nations with respect to the drug problem. The consequences are evident: more "coca dependency" on both sides, reflected in more underdevelopment in the Andean nations and in more consumption in the US accompanied by increased crime and [in]security.

Unfortunately, despite the inclusion of policies of aid towards the Andean region, US foreign drug policy does not adequately face these security issues. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) endorses alternative development programs (ADPs). However, important projects related to commodities that might be exported and thus compete with US products have been rejected in the US due to strong lobbying by interest groups. For instance, the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) approved in the year 1991 was designed to promote export diversification and to create new employment in its beneficiary countries. However, it excluded key Andean products like tuna, sugar, shoes, textiles and petroleum from preferential access to US markets.

(Shining Path) insurgency following the capture of its leader Abimael Guzman in 1993, has permitted the government a larger freedom of movement in the upper Huallaga valley and consequently a drop of coca cultivation in this region. However, Sendero Luminoso has not disappeared from the political map and there are geographical areas in which insurgents loyal to this group still constitute a menace for the security of rural populations.

50 "According to Human Rights agencies the paramilitary forces are responsible for most of the masacres in its increasingly brutal confrontation with Marxist insurgents and government troops. Both the rebels and the paramilitary groups have admitted to taking money from drug traffickers." Richard Morris and Juanita Darling, Los Angeles Times, June 22, 2000.

Underlying these exceptions was the objective (not always justified) to protect American products whose commercialisation could be affected by Andean exports. Since ATPA was supposed to expire on December 2001, prior to that date Andean nations requested that the US extended the deadline and expand the benefits. American producers successfully lobbied US policymakers against the extension of ATPA arguing excessive competition with their products. Under the Clinton administration, the US Congress voted down an extension of ATPA on two occasions. That happened despite reports by the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) asserting that the probable effect of ATPA on US industrial and producing sectors would be minimal,[51] and by the Department of Labor that consistently found that ATPA did not appear to have an adverse impact on or be a significant threat to the US.

In February 2002, the US Congress approved the Andean Trade Preference Extension Act (ATPEA), extending the trade benefits to the year 2005. Unfortunately, like in ATPA, ATPEA also establishes as a condition to receiving trade benefits that the country meets counter-narcotics certification criteria for eligibility for US assistance. That implies that when a country is decertified, the US President can terminate, suspend, or limit the trade benefits derived from ATPEA at any time. As a consequence, as happened with ATPA, the potential application of trade-related sanctions in the certification process constitutes a serious limitation to the objectives of ATPEA. It creates uncertainty not for drug traffickers but for legal investment in the region. Given the possibility of being suspended, the incentives offered by ATPEA may not be an attractive instrument to increase investment. The objective of providing a stronger base upon which to operate in the future – so necessary for attracting investment- is not necessarily offered.

Among the problems that obstruct the efficacy of ADPs it is important to mention the damaging effects of the forced eradication programs (mainly aerial chemical fumigation) - endorsed by US military aid in the Andean region -. Although denied by the American authorities, on occasions forced eradication aggravates the problem of illegal drug crops instead of contributing to its solution. For instance, the spraying of pesticides[52] has destroyed agricultural projects in Colombia. After seeing acres of their crops destroyed,

51 United States International Trade Commission, Andean Trade Preference Act, Sixth Report, Investigation # 352-352, Impact on the United States, (1998) p. 69.

the peasants have reverted to coca cultivation. As a result, ADPs have suffered from eradication programs rather than acting as a complement to the same overall strategy.[53] Moreover, aerial fumigation has also had significant human costs in Colombia where an absence of short-term food aid or long-term development aid for poor farmers and their families has exacerbated hunger and desperation when food crops are fumigated along with drug crops.[54]

Another problem with the policies of aid has to do with the way in which these are evaluated in the US. With respect to ADPs, these are considered as tried and failed projects, with no direct effect on drug trafficking. It is said that more economic development in coca growing areas has not necessarily meant either fewer hectares of coca planted, or less cocaine in the international market. The problem with this view is that it pays attention to only one part of the equation, focusing mainly on immediate or quantifiable results. Issues such as the number of hectares of drugs eradicated, percentage decline in the amount of cocaine entering the US, number of aircraft seized or intercepted, amount of cocaine seized, and the number of arrests of major traffickers dominate reports and news. Not surprisingly, there is a remarkable trend in the US to approve assistance programs in which the provisions for US military aid are always larger than those authorised for ADPs.[55]

Although important, the evaluations mentioned in the above paragraph are not enough. They do not take into consideration that ADPs constitute an instrument needed to face the

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52 Although currently it is prohibited in Bolivia and Peru, it is still in force in Colombia

53 See European NGO Council on Drugs and Development (ENCOD), "In Search of Cooperative Solutions", Press Release # 1 - September 1998, http://www.tni.org/drugs/encod/andes.doc

54 The Inter-American Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA), Earthjustice, WOLA, and LAWG have released in February 2004 their analyses of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative - regarding the aerial drug eradication program in Colombia – noting that there have been human and environmental effects of aerial spraying, the increase of coca cultivation in other regions, and an anti-democratic trend in Colombian governance associated with the spraying program. Over 6,500 farmers filed complaints with the Colombian government's Ombudsman between late 2001 and October 2002, alleging that they lost their legal crops to spraying; to date, only five have been compensated by the United States. According to a Colombian government survey, an estimated 50,000 people, roughly 15 percent of the population in Putumayo, left the heavily sprayed province in 2002. Without adequate alternative development assistance, many began growing coca elsewhere while others have been forced into the ranks of the guerrilla or the paramilitaries, who offer steady pay. See Lara Jill Rosenblith, "New Reports Expose Hidden Failures of US Anti-Drug Policy in Colombia", http://environment.about.com/b/a/068297.htm, article retrieved on April 15, 2004.

55 For instance in the Andean Counter-drug Initiative (ACI) budget prepared by the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office (INL), the provisions for interdiction and eradication not only have increased during the years 2002, 2003, and 2004 but also are larger than those for alternative development and institution building. See International Narcotics and Law Enforcement: FY 2004 Budget Justification -Report Home Page released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, June 2003, http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rpt/cbj/fy2004/21880.htm.

various problems peasants confront in Andean rural zones. It is not possible at the theoretical level to give a direct and unambiguous answer to the question of whether foreign aid helps to promote economic development in Andean countries, and thus, in the present case, to help in the fight against narcotraffic. Some literature on development suggests that the sources of economic growth and improvements in social welfare do not depend on external aid but lie primarily within a country.[56] However, in the rural areas of Andean countries dedicated to the production of coca, the legal sources of economic growth are minimal or have been dramatically altered by such production. ADPs cover a broad range of socioeconomic initiatives directed toward alleviating poverty, generating licit employment alternatives, and improving the well-being of people in rural areas that produce coca through the promotion of agricultural activities as well as those directed at increasing awareness and community participation. The results may not be immediately quantified but that does not mean that they are ineffective.

Furthermore, the failures attributed to ADPs could also be attributed to the policies of control in US foreign drug policy such as the process of certification and the provision of military aid, especially considering that these policies have received more emphasis and funding than that given to ADPs. In fact, despite the deployment of thousands of US troops in support of the drug war, the increasing US funding in this regard, the well-publicised tactical successes in interdiction results, and the annual application of the process of certification, these strategies have not lowered regional production of drugs or restricted the availability of illegal drugs in the US either. Illegal drugs are cheaper and more readily available now than they were when the war on drugs was launched.[57]

In sum, the previous analysis of US foreign drug policies makes it evident first, that the state-based realist notion of security prevailing in this policy area does not necessarily correspond to the situation of insecurity caused by the drug problem in the Andean region. The restricted notion of security does not take into consideration the problems of sub-national actors such as the rural communities exposed to the leverage of narcotraffickers, and the difficulty that Andean governments face in maintaining control

56 Peter Boone, "Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid", European Economic Review, 40 (1994) pp. 289-329
57 Various analysts coincide on this observation. See for instance, Task Force Report, Rethinking International Drug Control. Also, the articles by Peter Reuter, "The Limits of Drug Control", http://www.afsa.org/fsj/jan02/reuter.cfm,

over transnational criminal actors. Second, this analysis also notes that coercive policies may curtail the objective of trade and promotion of development foreseen by the schemes of aid. In fact, as described above, the sanctions included in the process of certification may deter potential investment that which the ATPEA and ADPs are supposed to promote in the Andean region. Likewise, the strategies promoted or assisted by US military aid - mainly eradication and fumigation - have detrimental effects in rural areas, particularly regarding ADPs. Finally, the emphasis given to the application of coercive measures - and thus by extension, to their harmful effects – not only disregards the consideration of social and economic vulnerabilities that affect the rural areas were coca is grown. It also contributes to their permanence and indirectly paves the way for the negative influence of drug dealers in the region. Given this scenario, it is necessary to question and modify the formulation and application of the regulations included in US foreign drug policy.

III.- Guidelines for a more appropriate securitization of the drug problem

As described in the previous sections of this paper, the current securitixation of the drug problem based on a restrictive and negative definition of national security[58] yields harmful consequences. Nonetheless, given the threatening effects of the drug problem, its securitisation - in a more appropriate and less harmful way - is crucial. In order to take the first step towards a coherent application of US foreign drug policy, the securitisation of the drug problem requires widening of the narrow spectrum of security currently prevailing in this policy area.

Recognising that security is an area of competing actors but a biased one in which the state is still privileged as the actor endowed with security attributes, the "Copenhagen

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"One Tough Plant" (Published March 31, 2000), http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900203, "A Certifiable Drug Policy" (Published on August 23, 2000), http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=900118

58 Tickner notes that national security is defined negatively, when it is perceived as protection from 'outside threats,' reinforced by the doctrine of state sovereignty, which strengthens the boundary between a secure community and a dangerous external environment. J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visioning Security." In Ken Booth and Steve Smith, International Relations Theory Today, (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 1995) p.189

School,"[59] proposes to expand the security agenda to include a wider range of sectors than the traditional military and political. Security is viewed as comprising five "sectors:" military, environmental, economic, political, and societal. However, this school warns, the expansion of the security agenda is not just about tacking the word "security" onto *economic, environmental, and societal.* Instead, it requires giving careful thought to what is meant by security and applying that understanding to a range of dynamics fundamentally different from the traditional ones.

Each sector has its own referent object and threat agenda. Thus, a variety of different values (i.e.: sovereignty, wealth, identity, sustainability, and so on) can be the focus of power struggles.[60] In the military sector, the state – concretely, its territorial integrity - has been and largely remains the primary referent object, and the threats are defined in external, military terms. In contrast, in the environmental sector security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere, and the threat lies on the circular relationship between civilisation and the environment in which the manipulation of this latter by the former has achieved self-defeating proportions. In the political sector, the legitimacy of a governmental authority is the referent object. The relevant threats can be ideological and sub-states. As a result, state authorities may be threatened by elements of their own societies, or vice-versa, states could become the primary threat to their own societies. In the societal sector the identity of the social group or community is the referent object. The threats are dynamics as diverse as cultural flows or population movements, among others, that may affect the survival of the community. The economic sector is rich in referent objects, ranging from individuals through classes and states to the abstract and complex system of the global market itself. What constitutes an existential economic threat depends upon the referent object. For individuals for instance,

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59This name refers to the body of work about security issues developed mainly by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. See their book Security a New Framework for Analysis, (Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). These authors acknowledge the possible link between state and security, but reject the state-centric position as a predetermined outcome. The description of the five sectors made in this section is based upon this cited work.

60 It is also worthy noting that according to the Copenhagen School, although each sector generates its own distinctive units, once established these units can show up as key players in other sectors. Likewise, the securitisation of each sector can be more dominant or not dominant at all according to the level of analysis from which it is studied: global, non-regional subsystemic, regional, and local. A detailed explanation of these levels and their interrelation with the various sectors as well as of the links among sectors goes beyond the limit of the present paper. See chapter eight of Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, pp.163-193

economic security can be understood most clearly in terms of basic human needs: adequate food, water, clothing, shelter, and education.

Also in relation to the expansion of the security agenda, various voices outside of the state-based realist approach have argued for the inclusion of the individual in the security debate.[61] For instance, for proponents of the World Order perspective of human security, a vision of global security must start with the individual. Peace research scholars claim that the lack of access to basic material needs resulting from unjust economic and political structures constitutes structural violence whose effects can be as devastating as war.[62] Among these voices Booth raises the issue of "human emancipation." He notes:

> "Security means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and threat of war is one of those constraints together with poverty, poor education, political oppression, and so on."[63]

The situation in Andean rural areas where coca is produced constitutes probably one of the best examples in which security threats exist in various sectors, especially in the non-traditional ones such as the economic, environmental, and societal. In such a context the insecurity and consequently the lack of emancipation are reinforced by the two kinds of constraints mentioned by Booth. Added to the structural violence characterised by poverty, poor education, and lack of viable legal opportunities of work, there is the violence related to the war on drugs, enforced from various fronts by narcotics traffickers, insurgent groups, paramilitary and military forces.

Given this scenario, the inclusion in the security equation of the economic and social vulnerabilities affecting sub-national actors in the Andean rural areas should be taken as

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61 For the Copenhagen School, the inclusion of the individual as a referent of security in their expanded security agenda is considered in what they describe as the political sector, "because it is usually a question of establishing the principle of, for example human rights rather than of specific individuals appearing one by one as securitized referent objects." Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, 1998, p. 39

62 See Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," in Johan Galtung, Essays in Peace Research, (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1974), Vol. 1. In the same line, as noted by Bilgin, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its Human Development Report (1994) urged a move away from a state-centric approach that seeks peace understood as stability toward a people-centric approach. More recently Kofi Annan (1999) also embraced human security as a strategic guide to action. See Pinar Bilgin, "Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security", International Studies Review (2003) p. 203-222

63 Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation", Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 313-326.

an emergency case by policymakers in charge of the formulation and implementation of US foreign drug policy. The *"securitization"* of these vulnerabilities constitutes an essential condition to analyse more properly the situation currently existing in Andean rural zones. Under the lenses of realism whose referent object is the state it is not possible to see the various security sectors and the threats above mentioned or to consider as security issues those vulnerabilities affecting individuals. In order to expand the security agenda in US foreign drug policy and securitise the drug problem appropriately it is necessary to see this under different lenses.

Critical voices in the field of international relations warn that questions of representation, which are systematically excluded from foreign policy discourse, must be included if the United States is to be more capable in the future of understanding itself and the world in which it lives.[64] Otherwise, it is said, US policymakers, by failing to reflect upon the way they construct the reality of other regions, will continue to respond to that reality in traditional fashion instead of enhancing possibilities for more appropriate foreign policy options.[65] In this regard, among the various theoretical developments in the field of international relations that reject one or more of the realist key assumptions, voices from feminism, critical theory, and postmodernism can shed light on a more responsible analysis of the drug problem in Andean nations.

The important positions in IR mentioned above – which I will call here "critical approaches"- are impossible to summarise or group together without oversimplification. Nevertheless, it is plausible to underline some of their most common concerns and recommendations. Despite their differences,[66] all critical approaches argue for new forms of political community which are both less exclusionary towards those considered outsiders by traditional state-centered approaches, and more sensitive to their interests and needs. For instance, critical theory opens the way for analysis not only of poorer states but also of peoples whose lives have been characterised by poverty.[67] Post modernism stresses the interests of those who are different, including minorities and

64 George, Discourses of Global Politics, p. 207
65 See George, Discourses of Global Politics; and Campbell, Writing Security.
66 An account of their differences is given by Andrew Linklater , "Neo-realism in Theory and Practice," and by Steve Smith, "The Self-Images of a Discipline," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, International Relations Theory Today, pp. 24-26 and p. 257.
67 Lloyd Pettiford and Melissa Curley, Changing Security Agendas and the Third World, 61-63.

indigenous groups.[68] The goal of the feminist security discourse is to point out how unequal social relations can make all individuals insecure and to help conceptualise a definition of security that is people-centred and which transcends state and regional boundaries.[69] In general, critical approaches envisage a moral universalisation in which the recognition of the rights of non-nationals, and the need for collective action to promote the well-being of the marginal and excluded come to acquire greater significance in discussions about the purpose of foreign policy.[70] Their mode of inquiry is the social construction of the other in different contexts, providing a framework to study the relations between core states, and the people of the periphery.[71] They propose a politics of emancipation that looks to a democratic form of human security not achieved at the expense of others.[72]

The pursuit of these principles towards building a political community based on less exclusionary and more sensitive practices towards Andean nations may sound utopian or less effective for defenders of the traditional policies of control in the "war on drugs." However, non-government and non-profit organisations have applied these principles in concrete enterprises, with positive results in Andean rural areas.[73] These principles also coincide with some objectives of alternative development programmes supported by the United Nations, the European Union, and even by the US itself.[74]

An expanded security agenda beyond the traditional referents of security might help to improve the effectiveness of the policies of aid included in US foreign drug policy, and to modify the formulation and application of the policies of control. The following sections describe the important and concrete lessons that could be derived from critical

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68 Linklater, "Neo-realism in Theory and Practice," p. 259.
69 J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visioning Security," in Booth and Smith, International Relations Theory Today, pp175- 179.
70 Andrew Linklater, "The Problem of Community in International Relations," Alternatives, 1, (1990), p. 42. See also Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998).
71 Andrew Linklater, "The Problem of Community in International Relations."
72 See Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation", Review of International Studies, 17 (1991), pp. 313-326
73 Alternative development projects directed by NGOs that came to agreements with the communities, rather on a discourse which comes from outside, have proven to be effective to curb drug production. See Ricardo Vargas and Jackeline Barragan, "Drugs-linked crops and rural development in Colombia. An alternative action plan", Narcotics and Development Discussion Paper, (London: Catholic Institute of International Relations, January 1996) #1/4,10, pp. 9-14. Likewise, see Kevin Healy, "The Role of Economic Development: Policy Options for Increased Peasant Participation in Peru and Bolivia." In Raphael F. Perl Ed., Drugs and Foreign Policy, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) , pp.131-140. Healy describes the effective grassroots development experience of "El Ceibo" a Bolivian local organisation.

approaches for the modification of current US foreign drug policies towards Andean countries.

Guidelines to reduce the struggles of security among "nations" in US foreign drug policy

Noting that the definition of power solely as domination and control obscures elements of cooperation in interstate relations,[75] feminist voices in the field of international relations propose an alternative definition of power as the human ability to act in concert and to enable methods of cooperation based on coalition-building.[76] Feminists consider as venues to foster environments conducive to cooperation, methods of conflict resolution that seek to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes and involve making contextual judgments rather than appealing to absolute standards.[77]

The application of these principles is of utmost importance with respect to the process of certification. Confronting narcotics traffic has to be a common effort and all affected countries have to participate consistently. The certification process should be replaced by a process of "common evaluation" in which the US and the Andean nations analyse (at the same level, as cooperative countries and not as examiner and examinee) their anti-narcotics efforts, and proposals to establish concrete common goals. The implementation of a common evaluation directed towards coalition building is not an impossible enterprise. Specifically, with respect to building multilateral efforts in the evaluation of drug policies, the European Union (EU) and the Organisation of American States (OAS) have taken important initiatives.

The EU supports various ADPs and since 1991 has implemented special trade preferences for Andean nations.[78] In this regard, the EU also requires from the Andean nations an annual review of the application of the trade benefits and the implementation of alternative legal crops. However, such a review is never used by the EU as a strategy

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74 However, as mentioned earlier, due to the strong influence of realist concerns in US foreign drug policies, military aid and schemes of control have been prioritised at the expense of the adequate application of schemes of aid.
75 J. Ann Tickner, "Hans Morgenthau's principles of Political Realism," in James Der Derian, Ed. International Theory, Critical Investigations, (New York: New York University Press, 1992) p.62.
76 Jane S. Jaquette, "Power as Ideology: A Feminist Analysis," in Judith H. Stiehm, Women's Views of the Political World of Men (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1984), chapter 2
77 Tickner, "Hans Mogenthau's principles of Political Realism", pp. 60-66

of control and sanctions but as a self-evaluation of its development policies in Andean nations. Furthermore, in 1995 the EU initiated the "High Level Dialogue on Drugs," that has led to agreements on fundamental principles, such as shared responsibility for addressing the drug problem.[79]

Likewise, conscious that the unilateral US certification process creates obstacles and confrontations between the US and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, the OAS created the "Mechanism of Multilateral Evaluation," (MEM), which was applied for the first time in December 2000.[80] MEM has characteristics that contrast with those of the US certification process. There is total participation of the member states through experts who, based on norms and procedures of general application that were previously and mutually established, guarantee a fair evaluation. Sanctions of any kind are excluded. A final report is elaborated setting specific recommendations to forge cooperation, promote efforts to combat narcotics and develop programs of technical assistance in anti-narcotic initiatives. The OAS considers this mechanism as the first step towards the formation of a proposed hemispheric alliance whose main organ would be the "Anti-Narcotic Inter-Governmental Commission of the Western Hemisphere," in charge of overseeing anti-narcotic campaigns in the region.[81] However, a multilateral alliance will be successful only if all the members, including the US, abide by the rules.

The support of the US for the adequate implementation of the aforementioned projects is crucial. It requires of the US policy-making community a consistent effort to understand that, in order to achieve effective cooperation against the illegal drug trade, power cannot be exercised under the menace of sanctions and strategies that disrupt the security of the nations linked by the drug problem.

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78 Although some of its policies towards Andean countries (such as trade preferences) may also have some shortcomings in their implementation, the EU in contrast to the US emphasises trade and development instead of the coercive measures included in the process of certification.
79 See "EU's relations with the Andean Community", for a detailed information about this dialogue and other projects based on coalition building. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/andean/intro/index.htm.
80 For more information see Inter-American Dialogue, "Can an Anti-Narcotics Effort Be Multilateralized?" (Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue, Policy Brief, April, 2001).
81 Ibid

Towards an adequate emphasis on policies of aid

With respect to the ample variety of US aid programmes provided to Latin American countries, especially during the Cold War era some analysts criticised that often there was a thin line separating purely developmental grants and loans from sources ultimately motivated by security interests.[82] At the time of the post-Cold war era, specialists in USAID celebrated the new direction this was taking aside from security considerations.[83] Although these concerns are valid for many cases, in the area of US foreign drug policy towards Andean countries, there is no reason to draw a line between security issues and economic assistance. US aid towards Andean countries should be motivated by security concerns, but in its wider definition.

If the various aspects of security noted for instance by the Copenhagen School and by Booth were taken into consideration by US policymakers and their constituencies, there would be a better understanding of the important role of the policies of aid included in US foreign drug policy. The provision of US aid directed at forging economic development in Andean rural areas has a special objective that goes beyond mere "economic assistance" that the US provides in other instances. It is a necessary tool to fight against the economic and social vulnerabilities that put in danger the areas where coca is produced, and thus, to fight against drug trafficking – which intensifies and reproduces most of those vulnerabilities. As such this aid is a matter of security for both the US and the Andean nations.

Unless a strong programme of aid is provided to promote legal products and close the income differentials between growing coca and other income opportunities, peasants will remain in the production of coca.[84] As long as there is unemployment and pauperism in Andean rural areas, drug traffickers will have leverage over peasants and other inhabitants to turn these to the illegal drug industry. To face this situation an

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82 See Michael Todaro, Economic Development, (New York: Longman, 1994) p. 538. Observations like that were common during the Cold War era when US aid was directed especially to Central America and the Caribbean, under the name of development or income distribution grounds while the main objective was to avoid the spread of Communism in the region.

83 American Defense Monitor, "Changing the Focus of Foreign Aid", (Center for Defense Information, 1996), http://www.cdi.org/adm/transcripts/950/

84 As recognised by the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) there is no single commodity that can compete with coca in terms of profitability, ease of cultivation, frequency of harvesting, and market accessUnited States International Trade Commission, Andean Trade Preference Act, Fifth Report 1997, Investigation #1 / 4, 332-352, Impact on the United States, p. 158

insurmountable effort and vast funds directed to agriculture, infrastructure, and education, among others, are required.

Andean countries are investing considerable resources in their fight against illegal drug trade, but the demand for ADPs exceeds the ability of Andean governments to meet it. Due to the shortage of economic funds in these countries, US foreign aid if applied adequately is an invaluable asset. Although ADPs have not made great strides in reducing drug supplies[85] and still need some adjustments in their application,[86] they create fewer negative side effects than military aid or coercive crop eradication measures. Furthermore, presently they are the best available option to solve serious problems connected to and accelerated by drug trafficking, such as food scarcity and environmental decay in the regions where coca is grown and cocaine produced. In the medium and long run ADPs can help to improve the economic situation in these zones and thus, to direct peasants towards the production of legal crops.

As the description of current US policies mentioned in the previous sections has tried to underscore, in the area of US foreign drug policy towards Andean countries, issues such as US aid, US trade-concessions, Andean rural areas' development, and security (understood in wider terms) in the Andes and in the US, are all interrelated aspects. Considering security in its wider definition, that is, as the absence of structural violence, US policymakers should take into account that development is an essential tool in the fight against drug trafficking. Development however, cannot be promoted through the deployment of military aid in the Andean region. The stress put on military aid in US foreign drug policy should be shifted towards policies of aid that promote trade, sustainable development, and thus security.

85See for instance, Jason Thor Hagen, "Alternative Development Won't End Colombia's War", Foreign Policy in Focus, (2001), http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2001/0105altdev.html, and also the ENCOD report "In Search of Cooperative Solutions." Likewise, Jelsma sheds a pessimistic light on ADPs especially those promoted by the United Nations and the European Union. See Martin Jelsma, "Change of Course – An Agenda for Vienna," Drugs & Conflict Debate Papers, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, (March 2003) # 6, and "Global Trends, Lessons from Vienna" in http://www.mamacoca.org/FSMT_sept_2003/en/doc/jelsma_global_trends_en.htm

86 For instance, WOLA underscores the potential of ADPs as an important and effective tool both in combating the poverty of coca growing regions and in sustaining eradication efforts if these programs involve the local population in their design and implementation. In this regard for example, governors from Southern Colombia have offered to involve local communities in widespread but gradual manual eradication efforts coupled with rural development strategies. Likewise, the inclusion of market studies to ensure that alternative crops will provide a steady income for

Conclusion

The affirmation that realism has a strong policy-prescriptive component that has influenced US foreign policy is not new. Nonetheless, what this paper has attempted to underline is that this intersection between theory and practice has had an impact that goes beyond mere influence in the formulation and application of state-centered policies. The restricted realist framework of national security prevailing in this policy area (reflected in the content and application of US policies that coincide with the IR realist approach) has resulted not only in a biased and thus limited analysis of the drug problem, it has also contributed to accentuating the struggles of security among nations linked by the drug problem – the US and Andean countries – and the struggles among the notions of security affecting the various state and non-state actors affected by the illegal drug industry. Furthermore, that intersection has led to an incoherent application of the various regulations existing within this US policy area. As a consequence, the policies of aid directed towards promoting trade and development in the region are obstructed by policies of control that promote military and uncooperative strategies.

In order to face the security struggles about nations and notions which are implicit and promoted by US foreign drug policies, a first step consists of questioning the way in which the securitisation of the drug problem has been carried out in this policy area. For that purpose, bringing a human vision of security into this policy area is more than necessary. That will permit us to understand first, that the drug problem implies various interrelated insecurities not only for the US but also for the so-called drug supplier countries, and second, the urgency of applying policies not achieved at the expense of the security of others.

The leading position of the US in the Western Hemisphere should be exercised not with "big stick diplomacy" but by assuming a shared responsibility in the drug problem. US political power has to be understood in the US policymaking area as the ability to cooperate with and to empower Andean nations, not through military means but with aid policies directed at promoting trade and development. Aid, trade and development can

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farmers, and that these latter will have access to adequate post-harvest facilities and transport, as well the establishment of ADPs prior to the beginning of eradication efforts. See WOLA reports.

help Andean nations, and especially their peasant communities, to become politically and economically stronger in order to face the menace of drug trafficking.