

Prone to Conflict, but Resilient to Violence. Why Civil Wars Sometimes Do Not Happen: Insights from Peru and Bolivia

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Abstract

This article adds to the scarce literature on peace causes of internal violent conflict by taking a comparative look at escalation dynamics in Peru (1980-1995) and Bolivia (2000-2008). Leaning on the concept of 'resilience', the analysis explains why civil war happened in Peru but not in Bolivia despite similar structural conflict-propensity according to prominent theory. Altogether, the varying conflict paths reveal five interdependent peace causes for the seemingly deviant case of Bolivia: the agrarian reform of 1953, the primacy of institutional conflict regulation, the politicization of conflict, 'self-learning' processes, and the internationalization of the indigenous agenda. In the attempt to apply the findings beyond the Andean context, the Egyptian uprising leading to President Mubarak's ousting in February 2011 is cursorily looked at from a peace cause perspective. Notwithstanding the striking parallels between Bolivia and Egypt with respect to resilience, a universal generalization is not claimed due to the highly contextual nature of any escalation onset. However, the implications show ways of activating 'conflict-inhibiting' mechanisms from a scholarly and policy-maker perspective. These refer in particular to the state's role in the reproduction of violence, breeding grounds for social injustice, and the management of social mobilization.

Keywords: Bolivia, civil war, conflict, de-escalation, Egypt, escalation, generalization, insurgency, peace, Peru, protest, resilience, uprising, violence.

Introduction

Latin America has been neglected by peace and conflict studies in two ways. First, with the end of military dictatorships in the Southern Cone and the signing of peace accords after Central American civil wars, the research community has shifted towards regions that seem to be more relevant – including contemporary North Africa and the Middle East. The recent focal shift towards the 'Arab Spring' bears witness to that. Second, the majority of studies dealing with Latin America have been interested in identifying causes of violent conflict rather than causes of peace. Strikingly independent from empirical context, the latter aspect effectively applies to the entire research agenda of the discipline.

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The present article addresses both neglects by taking a comparative look at violent conflict dynamics in Peru (1980-1995) and Bolivia (2000-2008). These two cases seem particularly useful from a peace perspective given their striking resemblance but different outcome: on the one hand, both countries exhibit high levels of structural conflict propensity (e.g. horizontal inequality, coca abundance).¹ However, on the other hand, while Peru has experienced civil war from 1980 to 1995, no such conflict escalation has occurred in Bolivia during its 25-year-long democratization process, a phase that has been accompanied by conflict episodes leading the country to the brink of civil war. Thus, the question is, from where does this variance derive? While the causes of war in Peru have been analyzed extensively, the 'resilient' character of the Bolivian case has not. Hence, particularly the deviant Bolivian context will be of interest in this paper.

In order to solve this puzzle, the article will be structured as follows. First, the understanding of 'resilience' will be defined which is very much related to the still undeveloped concept of 'peace causes'. Second, the selection of Peru and Bolivia as significant cases will be explained on the basis of a Most-Similar-Systems Design (MSSD). Although the focus will be on the 'resilient' character of Bolivia, a brief summary of civil war in Peru will be given in order to understand the variance of the conflict paths. Third, the major conflict-inhibiting factors in Bolivia will be identified based on five conflict episodes between 2000 and 2008. Fourth, in the attempt to generalize the empirical findings, a comparative look at the Egyptian uprising in 2011 will cursorily discuss whether these conflict-inhibiting factors might be found beyond the Andean region. Finally, the findings will be concluded upon and challenges of generalization will be pointed out. For the most part, the empirical results are based on field research in La Paz and Cochabamba between 2008 and 2010.

The Concept of Resilience

Two decades after the end of the Cold War, peace and conflict research is still predominantly engaged with intrastate violence. Generally, the community has sought to understand the causes of phenomena such as civil war, terrorism, and state failure.² Indeed, violent conflict and disorder have raised far more attention than non-conflict or peaceful cooperation. While studies on causes of war have constituted the overwhelming majority of research in the discipline, a peace causes-perspective

¹ Svante E. Cornell, "The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict", *Journal of Peace Research*, 42 (2005), pp. 751-760; Gudrun Østby, "Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict", *Journal of Peace Research*, 45 (2008), pp. 143-162; Syed Mansoob Murshed and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeeddin, "Revisiting the greed and grievance explanations for violent internal conflict", *Journal of International Development*, 21 (2009), pp. 87-111; David Keen, "Greed and grievance in civil war", *International Affairs*, 88 (2012), pp. 757-777.

² Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, *Causes of War* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War", *World Development*, 39 (2011), pp. 199-211; Charles T. Call, *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010); Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, "Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war", *Oxford Economic Papers*, 61 (2009), pp. 1-27; Jack E. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, Mark Woodward, "A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability", *American Journal of Political Science*, 54 (2010), pp. 190-208; David Fielding and Anja Shortland, "The dynamics of terror during the Peruvian civil war", *Journal of Peace Research*, 49 (2012), pp. 847-862; David C. Hofmann, "The sociology of terrorism: people, places, and processes", *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 4 (2012), pp. 1-3.

has not been systematically elaborated yet.³ This perspective is confronted with a fundamental challenge: in addition to the difficulties of rendering operational a manifold non-conflict context, the lack of systematic and explicitly peace causes-oriented research questions the overall need of such an approach.⁴ Beyond the differentiation between negative peace (i.e. absence of direct violence) and positive peace (i.e. absence of structural violence), in particular, three perspectives have been discussed that at least imply a peace cause approach: While Brock understands peace as a process to overcome war, and Czempiel defines it as a process of decreasing violence and increasing equity, Senghaas has labeled peace a civilization project.⁵

The present article will apply an understanding of peace causes that is based on the concept of resilience. Originally, the term resilience derives from the academic discipline of psychology. 'Psychological resilience' studies the individual's tendency to cope with adversity, trauma, tragedy, or stress. More specifically, resilience is understood as the capacity to react to forms of stress by positive behavioral adaptation.⁶ Thus, it constitutes a two-dimensional feature of human behavior: on the one hand, it is about people's ability to anticipate some form of adversity;⁷ On the other hand, it is about positive adaptation which means people's (social) competence to meet tasks at a specifically challenging stage without backing down.⁸ Psychological research has been focused on ways to promote well-being and to protect against adversity.⁹ Not surprisingly, different facets of family structures in general and children in particular have been of primary interest. For instance, studies were done on children with schizophrenic parent(s) or on people's tendency to psychiatric distress after 9/11.¹⁰ Important to this article, it seems relevant to be aware that psychologists are controversial about the definition of resilience. For example, Ungar and others argue that the cultural and contextual character of any individual or group experiencing resilience is often not taken into account.¹¹

The notion of resilience has not been systematically applied by peace and conflict research. Its sparse use is found in studies on mental health in post-conflict or eco-management institutions.¹² Irrespective of the challenges the concept of resilience comes along with, its central ideas are useful to

³ Volker Matthies, "Eine Welt voller neuer Kriege?", *Der Bürger im Staat*, 54 (2004), p. 188.

⁴ Dieter Senghaas, *The Civilisation of Conflict: Constructive Pacifism as a Guiding Notion for Conflict Transformation* (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004), p. 2.

⁵ Senghaas, *The Civilisation of Conflict*, pp. 4-6; Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Friedensstrategien, Systemwandel durch Internationale Organisationen, Demokratisierung und Wirtschaft* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1986), p. 11; Lothar Brock, "Frieden, Überlegungen zur Theoriebildung", in *Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen*, ed. Volker Rittberger, (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), pp. 71-89.

⁶ S. S. Luthar and D. Cicchetti, "The construct of resilience: Implications for interventions and social policies", *Development and Psychopathology*, 12 (2000), pp. 857-85.

⁷ Ann S. Masten and J. Obradovic, J., "Competence and resilience in development", *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1094 (2006), pp. 13-27.

⁸ Masten and Obradovic, *Competence and resilience in development*, pp. 13-27.

⁹ Ann S. Masten, "Ordinary Magic: Lessons from Research on Resilience in Human Development", *Education Canada*, 49 (2010), pp. 28-32.

¹⁰ Luthar and Cicchetti, *The construct of resilience*, pp. 857-85.

¹¹ Michael Ungar et al., "Unique Pathways to Resilience across Cultures", *Adolescence*, 42 (2007), pp. 287-310.

¹² For instance, see Brian K. Barber, "Contrasting Portraits of War: Youths' varied Experiences with Political Violence in Bosnia and Palestine", *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, 32 (2008), pp. 298-309; Viet Nguyen-Gillham et al., "Normalising the Abnormal: Palestinian Youth and the Contradictions of Resilience in Protracted Conflict", *Health & Social Care in the Community*, 16 (2008), pp. 291-98; Victor Galaz, "Social-ecological Resilience and Social Conflict: Institutions and Strategic Adaptation in Swedish Water Management", *AMBIO*, 34 (2005), pp. 567-72.

sharpen the understanding of peace causes. Before integrating the notion of resilience into a rigid definition of peace causes, at first, it is important to be certain of the way a potential violent conflict onset is examined. Without knowing what a violent conflict looks like it will be difficult to identify the factors that could inhibit its outbreak. Given the different violence intensity between the Peruvian (at least 25.000 battle-related deaths) and the Bolivian case (less than 200), this article makes use of a qualitative definition of internal violent conflict. Leaning on the Heidelberg Conflict Information System (CONIS), internal violent conflict is defined as clashing of interests over national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties that are determined to pursue their interests and achieve their goals.¹³

Assuming that conflict actors at some point arrive at this stage, a peace causes perspective shall be able to explain why the intensity of clashes is not escalated by differences over values (i.e. latent conflict) to organized and systematic violence of long duration (i.e. war).¹⁴ Thus, in the following, a peace cause is not merely depicted along the positive versus negative peace paradigm. It is rather treated as a violent conflict-inhibiting cause: what factor is responsible for the conflict actors not crossing the threshold towards civil war? Analogical to the resilience-perspective, the adversaries' perception of the conflict status quo is assessed along two dimensions: the recognition of adversity and the subsequent positive adaptation to this worsened status quo. Hence, this article applies the following understanding of a peace cause: a factor that is capable of at least indirectly inhibiting the intensification of a conflict escalation process. This factor is enforced by at least one of the adversaries' positive adaptation to the conflict onset. That is, the means of contest are either altered for the sake of de-escalation or non-escalation in the first place.

Prone To Internal Violent Conflict: Peru and Bolivia

The selection of Peru and Bolivia as empirical cases is due to two essential circumstances. On the one hand, pursuant to dominant theories on the causation of civil war both countries exhibit similarly high levels of structural conflict propensity along very similar dimensions (i.e. inequality, poverty, discrimination, coca resources, etc.). By merely taking these structural dimensions into account one might expect similar outcomes. However, on the other hand, while Peru has experienced civil war from 1980 to 1995, no large-scale conflict escalation has occurred in Bolivia during its 25-year-long democratization process since 1985; a phase that had been accompanied by minor conflictive episodes.¹⁵ Thus, the question is from where does this variance of violent conflict intensity derive? The

¹³ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIK), *Conflict Barometer 2010* (Heidelberg: HIK, 2010), p. 88.

¹⁴ In addition to the comparability made possible by this qualitative definition, a process tracing approach of both high (i.e. Peru) and low intensity contexts (i.e. Bolivia) takes the wind out of critics' sails arguing that the analysis of the deviant case Bolivia might too heavily rely on counterfactuals. It does not, given the observable clashes of minor intensity during the conflictive episodes between 2000 and 2008.

¹⁵ While the death toll for the Peruvian conflict (1980-1995) amounts for between 25.000 and 70.000 people, the conflictive episodes in Bolivia have not gone beyond the annual battle-related death threshold of 1.000 casualties. Moisés Arce, "Political Violence and Presidential Approval", *Journal of Politics*, 65 (2003), p. 572; Daniel M. Masterson, "The Devolution of Peru's Sendero Luminoso: From Hybrid Maoists to Narco-Traffickers?", *History Compass*, 8 (2010), p. 51; Thomas Perreault, "From the Guerra del Agua to the Guerra del Gas: Resource Governance and Popular Protest in Bolivia", *Antipode*, 38 (2006), p. 164.

following overview will briefly present the similar background conditions. According to major theorems – i.e. grievance, greed, regime type, ethnic diversity –, the two Andean countries share structural conditions making them similarly prone to internal violent conflict.¹⁶ First, all three relevant indices (Gross Domestic Product, Human Development Index, Gini Coefficient) displaying potential to revolt due to socioeconomic grievances show that both countries suffered from a similar economic (under-) development during the same time period.¹⁷ Second, being the world's most important coca cultivators and cocaine producers next to Colombia, Peru and Bolivia show similar conflict propensity with regard to loot-seeking groups facing the beneficiary backdrop of coca abundance.¹⁸ However, Peru has been directly affected by so-called 'greed' while Bolivia has not (see below). Third, according to the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), both countries exhibit similar authority trends from late 1960s to the early 1990s. Altogether, the regime type in Peru and Bolivia has developed along a similar volatile 'anocracy' path – i.e. political regimes in the process of democratization.¹⁹ Fourth, despite marginal differences, Peru and Bolivia are similar with regard to their ethnic composition. Both countries are based on a significantly large majority of indigenous people. Moreover, indigenous descent is at least marginally correlated with (extreme) poverty in both societies.²⁰ Despite these structural similarities, only the Peruvian case has experienced a conflict of high violence intensity. The following overview summarizes the structural similarities with respect to violent conflict propensity. By following a Most-Similar-Systems Design (MSSD), a pair of cases resembles each other in every respect, except for the dependent variable and a varying causal factor.²¹ The latter is assumed to be responsible for the variance of the dependent variable.

¹⁶ Mariana Chacón and Witold Mucha, Indigenous Voices in the Andean Region: A Comparative Perspective on the Transitional Processes in Bolivia and Peru, in *Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation*, ed. Martin Leiner and Susan Flämig, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 115-116.

¹⁷ Rosemary Thorp, Corinne Caumartin, and George Gray-Molina, "Inequality, Ethnicity, Political Mobilisation and Political Violence in Latin America: The Cases of Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru", *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 25 (2006), pp. 457-459; United Nations Development Programme, *Los Cambios detrás del Cambio: Desigualdad y Movilidad Social en Bolivia* (La Paz: United Nations, 2010); United Nations Development Programme, *Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano: Perú 2022. Aprovechando las potencialidades* (Lima: United Nations, 2002).

¹⁸ Kai Ambos, "Attempts at drug control in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia", *Crime, Law & Social Change*, 26 (1997), pp. 125-127; Francisco E. Thoumi and Marcela Anzola, "Asset and money laundering in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru: a legal transplant in vulnerable environments?", *Crime, Law & Social Change*, 53 (2010), pp. 438-439; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *World Drug Report 2010* (Vienna: United Nations, 2010), p. 65.

¹⁹ Polity IV, Country Report 2010: Peru (Arlington: George Mason University, 2010); Polity IV, Country Report 2010: Bolivia (Arlington: George Mason University, 2010).

²⁰ Rosemary Thorp, Corinne Caumartin, and George Gray-Molina, George, "Inequality, Ethnicity, Political Mobilisation and Political Violence in Latin America: The Cases of Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru", *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 25 (2006), pp. 453-80.

²¹ John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 131.

Table 1: Structural Violent Conflict Propensity

Variable		Peru	Bolivia
Independent Variable (IV)	<i>Grievance</i>	A: Unequal Development	A: Unequal Development
	<i>Greed</i>	B: Coca Abundance	B: Coca Abundance
	<i>Regime Type</i>	C: Anocracy	C: Anocracy
	<i>Ethnic Diversity</i>	D: Indig. marginalization	D: Indig. marginalization
Dependent Variable (DV)		High Conflict Escalation	Low Conflict Escalation

In order to identify the variable(s) capable of explaining the variance between Peru and Bolivia, the different conflict paths will be cursorily presented.

Peru's first steps towards democratic rule were accompanied by guerilla attacks launched by the Maoist *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path Movement, henceforth SL). On the eve of the first presidential elections allowed by the military government on 17 May 1980, ballot boxes were burned in the town of Chushi in the Ayacucho region. This incident has been identified as the first 'act of war'.²² Throughout the 1980s, the guerilla grew in territory, organization, and popular support. By 1991, the group had control of much of the rural areas of the center and southern parts of Peru. 12 September 1992 marks the downfall of the guerilla, when its leader Abimael Guzmán was captured by the police. The organization fractured into splinter groups and guerilla activities diminished to a minimum extent.²³ However, that decline encouraged the state forces to increase their counterinsurgency actions which in turn would intensify the attacks by the remaining SL. These escalatory incidents would last until 1995.²⁴ According to the Peruvian *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, henceforth CVR) at least 23.969 people were killed between 1980 and 2000. However, due to the huge number of disappearances during the war, the CVR has declared that the real estimates of the death toll are likely to be around 69.280 people.²⁵

The Peruvian civil war has often been simplified as conflict driven by rebels waging war in order to make profit from cocaine traffic. However, the narco-dollar argument is incomplete. A more differentiated view is called for in order to understand the emergence of the SL. The Maoist guerilla was able to implicate the state into a 15-year-long civil war due to an opportune juncture of background and actor-related circumstances. First of all, the impact of the failed agrarian reforms of 1969 on the isolated Ayacucho area needs to be highlighted. In short, the land reforms resulted in benefits to a number of people that were better situated than they had been prior to those policies. However, the

²² Cynthia McClintock, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso Rebellion: Origins and Trajectory", in *Power and Popular Protest. Latin American Social Movements*, ed. Susan Eckstein (London: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 62-64.

²³ Lewis Taylor, "Counter-insurgency Strategy, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso and the Civil War in Peru, 1980-1996", *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 17 (1998), pp. 35-58.

²⁴ Sergio Koc-Menard, "Switching from Indiscriminate to Selective Violence: The Case of the Peruvian Military (1980-95)", *Civil Wars*, 8 (2006), pp. 332-37.

²⁵ Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, *Informe Final* (Lima: CVR, 2003), p. 53.

already most disadvantaged and deprived segment of Peru's peasantry – i.e. *sierra comuneros* – was rendered even more vulnerable to economic crisis.²⁶ The traditionally marginalized and isolated rural-based Ayacucho department was particularly affected.²⁷ Not surprisingly, due to the government's incapacity to foster sustainable development in this region, the SL filled that void by providing services the central state was not capable or willing to do.²⁸ In return, the department became the major retreat and recruitment area to the SL. Beyond these two interdependent background causes, the state has been criticized for underestimating the guerilla at the beginning with their first operations in the early 1980s.²⁹ Indeed, not until late 1982, did the government deploy the armed forces into the emergence zone of Ayacucho.³⁰ Given the repressive nature of the counterinsurgency and the counter-violence by the SL, the death toll shot up significantly between 1983 and 1984. However, in the late 1980s, the state forces regained legitimacy after adjusting their approach towards a more bottom-up oriented strategy and less indiscriminate violence.³¹ Pretty much at the same time, the SL began to expand their operations to urban areas around Lima and increased their activities in the coca-abundant Upper Huallaga area.³² In summary, the high conflict escalation in Peru between 1980 and 1995 can be best explained by the conjuncture of four factors: first, the impact of the failed agrarian reforms on the Ayacucho department; second, the initially inadequate counterinsurgency by the state; third, the eventual criminalization of coca by the SL. Furthermore, the capabilities of the SL, that had begun to organize its armed struggle already in late 1960s, should not be underestimated as conflict-fuelling factor; and fourth, a majority of scholars has particularly stressed the influence of the charismatic leader Abimael Guzmán in this regard.³³

In contrast to Peru, conflict episodes in Bolivia between 2000 and 2008 were characterized by clashes between a loosely coordinated protest movement, on the one hand, and the state, on the other. Bolivia's first democratic change of government in 1985 had marked the beginning of a phase of relative stability which was characterized by party-dominated consensual politics. Structural adjustment policies (SAP) according to the 'Washington Consensus', democratic reforms, and consensual politics within the so-called *Democracia Pactada* (Pacted Democracy) featured the state during the 1990s.³⁴ At the latest, by 1999, the dynamic reform era began to run dry and was succeeded by years of

²⁶ Cristóbal Kay, "Estructura agraria, conflicto y violencia en la sociedad rural de América Latina", *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 63 (2001), p. 170.

²⁷ David Scott Palmer, "Rebellion in Rural Peru. The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso", *Comparative Politics*, 18 (1986), p. 137.

²⁸ Carlos Iván Degregori, "Por qué apareció Sendero Luminoso en Ayacucho? El desarrollo de la educación y la generación del 69 en Ayacucho y Huanta". In *Historizar el pasado vivo en América Latina*, ed. Anne Pérotin-Dumon (Santiago de Chile: Universidad Alberto Hurtado, 2007), pp. 8-12.

²⁹ Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso", *World Politics*, 37 (1984), p. 52.

³⁰ Max G. Manwaring, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path Beckons", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 541 (1995), p. 162.

³¹ David Scott Palmer, "Terror in the Name of Mao: Revolution and Response in Peru", *Perspectivas Latinoamericanas*, 2(2005), pp. 96-100

³² Svante E. Cornell, "The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict", *Journal of Peace Research*, 42 (2005), pp. 757-758.

³³ Cynthia McClintock, "Sendero Luminoso: La Guerilla Maoista del Perú". *Revista Occidental*, 3 (1986), pp. 131-153; Palmer, *Rebellion in Rural Peru. The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso*, pp. 133-140; Manwaring *Peru's Sendero Luminoso: The Shining Path Beckons*, pp. 157-166; James Ron, "Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso's Tactical Escalation", *Journal of Peace Research*, 38 (2001), pp. 569-592.

³⁴ Claudia Zilla, *Externe Demokratieförderung in Bolivien. Die Politik Deutschlands und der Europäischen Union* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2006), p. 7.

legitimacy crises coupled with socio-political unrest.³⁵ Violent protests demanding greater participation in decision-making processes with respect to resource management and claims for regional autonomy as reaction against indigenous mobilization made up the major issues.³⁶ However, despite repeated confrontations between protesters and state forces in 2000, twice in 2003, 2005, and 2008, altogether, less than 200 people were killed.

Given the different actor constellation in Peru and Bolivia, one might expect that the better organized and trained guerilla was the crucial explanatory factor for the varying escalation intensity. Certainly, a spontaneous protest movement could not have been as conflictive as an experienced rebel group such as the SL. However, there have been radical elements within the opposition movement in Bolivia, too, that were not able to take over the lead and set a military agenda. Thus, the question of 'why did civil war not happen in Bolivia' will have to be refined. The 'non-outbreak' or 'low level conflict' will have to be explained by the protest movement's resilience to militarization: what factor inhibited the emergence of an armed opposition? The following section will provide the respective 'peace causes'.

Why Did Civil War Not Happen in Bolivia?

This section will be structured along two steps. First, the most relevant violent conflict episodes in Bolivia between 2000 and 2008 will be described. Second, five peace causes (or 'conflict-inhibiting factors') will be presented. This twofold proceeding is useful given the 'resilient' overlaps between the episodes.

'*Guerra del Agua*' (1999-2000): In April 2000, the Bolivian city of Cochabamba erupted into protests against attempts by the state to privatize its drinking water and sewerage services. The so-called *Guerra del Agua* (water war) quickly took on national significance, as tens of thousands of people took to the streets and demonstrated against the increases in prices (of up to 275%).³⁷ Although the government declared a state of siege, in the process of suppressing these blockades four people were killed.³⁸ Ultimately, the protests forced the government to rescind the concession made to the foreign-owned firm 'Aguas de Tunari'.³⁹

'*IMF Income Tax*' (2003): Similar to the *Guerra del Agua*, popular demonstrations against the government arose due to the government's announcement to implement an income tax for mid and

³⁵ Ton Salman, "Bolivia and the Paradoxes of Democratic Consolidation", *Latin America Perspectives*, 34 (2007), pp. 111-12.

³⁶ Kent Eaton, "Backlash in Bolivia: Regional Autonomy as a Reaction against Indigenous Mobilization", *Politics & Society*, 35 (2007), p. 71.

³⁷ Susan Spronk and Jeffery R. Webber, "Struggles against Accumulation by Dispossession in Bolivia: The Political Economy of Natural Resource Contention", *Latin American Perspectives*, 34 (2007), pp. 31-47; Willem Assies, "David versus Goliath in Cochabamba: Water Rights, Neoliberalism, and the Revival of Social Protest in Bolivia", *Latin American Perspectives*, 30 (2003), pp. 14-36.

³⁸ Rocio Bustamante, "The water war: resistance against privatisation of water in Cochabamba, Bolivia", *REGA*, 1 (2004), pp. 41-42; Susan Spronk, "Roots of Resistance to Urban Water Privatization in Bolivia: The "New Working Class," the Crisis of Neoliberalism, and Public Services", *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 71 (2007), pp. 16-17.

³⁹ Perreault, *From the Guerra del Agua to the Guerra del Gas: Resource Governance and Popular Protest in Bolivia*, p. 150.

high income earners.⁴⁰ This tax hike made up a further element of the privatization process demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).⁴¹ Opposition from different social sectors formed up and this time lower ranked policemen, who would be affected by the income tax, joined the protest movement. In order to control the situation, the executive sent military forces to the centres of the demonstrations. The clashes between the police and the military caused about 30 deaths.⁴² Ultimately, the protests ceased when the government withdrew the decree.⁴³

'*Guerra del Gas I*' (2003): The *Guerra del Gas* (gas war) in October 2003 constituted one of the most critical moments of Bolivia's democracy since democratic rule was re-established in 1985. Tens of thousands of protesters participated in violent demonstrations against the De Lozada government. These were caused by the government's intention to export natural gas via a Chilean sea port in the Pacific. Similar to the IMF income tax conflict a few months earlier, the government responded by using military forces against the demonstrators which resulted in around 70 fatalities and 200 wounded.⁴⁴ Repudiated by large sectors of the population, President De Lozada resigned and fled to Miami. Carlos Mesa, then vice-president, constitutionally succeeded him.⁴⁵

'*Guerra del Gas II*' (2005): As announced at his inauguration, Mesa submitted the contested gas issue to the public by calling for a national referendum in which voters were asked to give their opinion on the future of the country's oil and gas reserves in July 2004.⁴⁶ The referendum's outcome was the approving of the export of gas, albeit under stronger state control. Despite that tactical victory, Mesa was ousted in June 2005 in the context of new large-scale protests of the same actors demanding the nationalization of the gas reserves. Given the threat of violence escalation and growing secession demands by the eastern provinces, this time, the security apparatus was not ordered to intervene. Instead, Mesa resigned and the Congress agreed on then president of the Supreme Court of Justice Eduardo Rodríguez as interim president. He was sworn in on 10 June 2005 and announced that elections would take place in December 2005.⁴⁷

'*Autonomy Clashes*' (2006-2008): The election of the country's first Aymara-Indian president, Evo Morales, in the December 2005 elections did not end the climate of instability. For instance, this became apparent in clashes between opponents and supporters of Morales' reforms in the northern department

⁴⁰ Willem Assies and and Ton Salman, *Crisis in Bolivia: The Elections of 2002 and their Aftermath* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 2003), pp. 60-62; Jeffery R. Webber, "Carlos Mesa, Evo Morales, and a Divided Bolivia (2003-2005)", *Latin American Perspectives*, 37 (2010), pp. 51-52.

⁴¹ Carlos Arze and Tom Kruse, "The Consequences of Neoliberal Reform", *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 38 (2004), p. 23.

⁴² Assies and Salman, *Crisis in Bolivia: The Elections of 2002 and their Aftermath*, pp. 60-62.

⁴³ Barry Ames, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, *Elites, Institutions and the Mass Public: A New Look at Bolivian Democracy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2004), p. 8.

⁴⁴ Carlos Vacaflares R. and Pilar Lizárraga A., "La lucha por el excedente del gas y la resignificación de las contradicciones de la identidad regional en Bolivia. Proyectos de dominación y resistencia en una región productora de hidrocarburos", *OSAL*, 6 (2005), pp. 23-25; Brent Z. Kaup, "Negotiating through nature: The resistance materiality and materiality of resistance in Bolivia's natural gas sector", *Geoforum*, 39 (2008), p. 1738

⁴⁵ Ames, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson, *Elites, Institutions and the Mass Public*, p. 9.

⁴⁶ John-Andrew McNeish, "Stones on the Road: The Politics of Participation and the Generation of Crisis in Bolivia", *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 25 (2006), p. 221.

⁴⁷ Ton Salman, "The Jammed Democracy: Bolivia's Troubled Political Learning Process", *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 25 (2006), p. 163.

Pando in September 2008 (approximately 30 dead).⁴⁸ The latter incident reflected a new conflict cleavage constitutive for the years to come. On the one hand, there were the *cruzeño* elites striving for regional autonomy in order to maintain their economic and political status quo. On the other hand, there were Morales' supporters fighting for the redistribution of the nation's wealth to the formerly unprivileged (indigenous) majority.⁴⁹

Notwithstanding these violent episodes leading the state repeatedly to the brink of civil war, no such escalation did eventually happen. The question needs to be answered, therefore, what had made the Bolivian state or rather its constituents resilient to not crossing that threshold? What did Bolivia have that Peru did not? Altogether, five very much interdependent peace causes have determined the escalation path in Bolivia between 2000 and 2008.

National Revolution and Land Reform (1952, 1953)

The National Revolution in 1952 represents the most significant structural conflict-inhibiting factor. This is not only due to initiating a nationally defined state model beyond a traditional left-wing versus right-wing pattern. Apparently, it had constrained the susceptibility of left-radical dogmas as seen for instance in Peru, Nicaragua, or El Salvador.⁵⁰ More important, the following agrarian reform in 1953 paved the way for a broad distribution of land to the indigenous communities. In contrast to the Peruvian neighbour where land reforms disrupted the patron-client system in a way that made some classes of cultivators more vulnerable to subsistence crises than before and thus more susceptible to the guerilla's dogma, agrarian legislation in Bolivia enhanced the indigenous people's economic status quo.⁵¹ For instance, while four-fifths of the country's agricultural land was expropriated in Bolivia, only half of such land was in Peru.⁵² Moreover, about three-quarters of agricultural households were incorporated into the reformed sector in Bolivia; the proportion of beneficiaries was about one-third in Peru.⁵³ Important to the comparative perspective, while reforms in Peru were launched by authoritarian governments, the land reform in Bolivia was initiated from outside the traditional political system, namely after a violent outburst.⁵⁴ Both agrarian reforms were sweeping with regard to scope and expected impact. However, only in Bolivia, the situation to formerly deprived communities was at least not worsened. Given the different ownership of designing and implementing the reforms, this variance is not

⁴⁸ Jeffery Webber, "Rebellion to Reform, Part III: Neoliberal Continuities, the Autonomist Right, and the Political Economy of Indigenous Struggle", *Historical Materialism*, 16 (2008), pp. 67-109.

⁴⁹ Magda von der Heydt-Coca, "Neoliberal Agenda in Bolivia and its Aftermath", *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, 8 (2009), pp. 347-371.

⁵⁰ Christina Meyer, *Underground Voices: Insurgent Propaganda in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991).

⁵¹ Alain De Janvry and Lynn Ground, "Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America", *Latin American Perspectives*, 5 (1978), pp. 101-105.

⁵² De Janvry and Ground, *Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America*, pp. 91-92.

⁵³ De Janvry and Ground, *Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America*, p. 92.

⁵⁴ De Janvry and Ground, *Types and Consequences of Land Reform in Latin America*, p. 92; T. David Mason, "'Take Two Acres and Call Me in the Morning': Is Land Reform a Prescription for Peasant Unrest?", *The Journal of Politics*, 60 (1998), pp. 199-230; T. David Mason and Janet Swartzfeger, "Land reform and the rise of Sendero Luminoso in Peru", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1 (1989), pp. 516-538; Ronald H. Berg, "Sendero Luminoso and the Peasantry of Andahuaylas", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 28 (1986), pp. 165-196.

surprising. Indeed, the agrarian reform of 1953 reduced the risks of violent conflict on the countryside in Bolivia to a significant extent.⁵⁵

Primacy of Institutional Conflict Regulation

Closely related with the National Revolution of 1952, a majority of interviewees has pointed to the emergence of a cultural peculiarity in Bolivia. Experiences with dictatorship prior to 1952 and after 1964 have made an entire generation refuse autocratic and repressive means exercised by the state.⁵⁶ Moreover, citizens who had directly taken part in the National Revolution renounced violence themselves as means to pursue individual or collective interests.⁵⁷ A look at the aforementioned conflict episodes helps to strengthen the argument. Indeed, the *Guerra del Agua* and the IMF Income Tax conflict were de-escalated by the withdrawal of a specific law. The conflictive issues of the first and second *Guerra del Gas* were settled by resignation and, in the latter case, also by snap elections. Additionally, the autonomy conflict between the western and eastern departments was primarily fought by referenda.⁵⁸ Moreover, after realizing the lack of allies at the national level and the huge legitimacy on behalf of the Morales government, eventually, the eastern departments fought for their agenda within the Constitutional Assembly.⁵⁹ Significantly, more recent and less violent conflicts in Bolivia are met with similar institutionally based conflict mechanisms by the state. For instance, on 1 January 2011, President Morales withdrew a proposal for a 73 per cent increase in the price of gasoline after government offices were ransacked by protesters and important roads blocked by former supporters of Morales.⁶⁰ Apparently, both the state and society have 'positively adapted' to experiences made in the past.

Self-Learning Process by Political Class

The imperative of institutional conflict regulation points to a striking development among governments between 2000 and 2008. During the first three conflict episodes, the Banzer (1997-2001), Quiroga (2001-2002) and De Lozada (2002-2003) governments had demonstrated the state's traditional attitude towards popular mobilization: ignoring and trivializing of protests' signs, subsequent confrontation by violent repression, and finally giving in and signing last-minute agreements which are effectively not followed and which in turn fuel new rounds of protest.⁶¹ State repression had led to counter-violence by the protest movement during the IMF Income Tax conflict and even more so during the first *Guerra del Gas* in 2003 (i.e. 'escalated force'). Significantly, after De Lozada's stampede in October 2003, his successor Mesa altered the state's active role in the reproduction of violence. His decision not to intervene with the armed forces against the demonstrators and instead to announce

⁵⁵ Kay, *Latin America's Agrarian Reform*, p. 24.

⁵⁶ Henry Oporto, *Interview*, 4 June 2010, La Paz.

⁵⁷ Guillermo Cuentas, *Interview*, 9 June 2019, La Paz.

⁵⁸ Eaton, *Backlash in Bolivia*, pp. 71-102.

⁵⁹ Jonas Wolff, "Frieden trotz Umbruch: Eine Analyse der ausbleibenden Gewalteskalation in Boliviens »demokratischer Revolution«", *Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung*, 2 (2012), pp. 235-236.

⁶⁰ The reorganization of the cabinet poses another institutional means used by Morales to acquiesce the people. See Simon Romero, "After Move to Cut Subsidies, Bolivian Ire Chastens Leader", *The New York Times* (30 January 2011).

⁶¹ Willem Assies, "David versus Goliath in Cochabamba. Water Rights, Neo-liberalism, and the Revival of Social Protest in Bolivia", *Latin American Perspectives*, 30 (2003), p. 15.

elections in 2005 revealed an important self-learning process among the political caste (i.e. 'negotiated management').⁶² The aforementioned withdrawal of the gasoline price increase by Morales in January 2011 as response to popular demands also fits into this 'learning process'. In contrast to former approaches, the bloody experiences of the conflict episodes between 2000 and 2003 have made governments rethink their ways of dealing with social mobilization.⁶³

Not less important, the role of the military leadership needs to be taken into account in this regard. Several interviewees have emphasized the military leaders' surprise with the escalation intensity particularly during the *Guerra del Gas* in 2003.⁶⁴ Facing President De Lozada's loss of legitimacy and the increasing number of masses heading towards La Paz, on October 17, the armed forces had denied their support to the government.⁶⁵ Notwithstanding the military's de-escalating decision not to repress the protests any longer in October 2003, it is unlikely that solely a 'self-learning process' was responsible. As seen during the autonomy clashes between 2006 and 2009, the armed forces strategically chose to back the Morales government rather than its traditional allies consisting of the political and economic elites of the eastern departments.⁶⁶

Politicization of Conflict

In contrast to the Maoist SL in Peru, the oppositional stakeholders in Bolivia were not interested in sweeping away the democratic system. The means and goals differed significantly from the guerilla. This was not merely due to the configuration of the protest movement, but also due to the achievements of their actions. Given the potential large-scale impact of policies such as sharp water price increases during the *Guerra del Agua*, almost everybody joined the protests. These included the local population, neighbourhood associations, the coca growers from Chapare, the middle class, students, workers, civic organizations, in some cases the police forces, youth gangs, and even members of the Catholic Church.⁶⁷ In short, the heterogeneous make-up of the opposition impeded more radical elements within the group to pursue the collective struggle by violent means. Even the joining of radical groups such as the Aymaran militia 'Ponchos Rojos' did not change the character of anti-state protests. Given that members of the lower and middle class mostly inexperienced in armed combat became the driving

⁶² Witold Mucha, "Frieden ist kein Zufall: Wie Bürgerkriege in Ägypten und Bolivien verhindert wurden", *Wissenschaft & Frieden*, 4 (2012), p. 46.

⁶³ Given that both the politically unaffiliated Mesa and left-wing Morales had 'learned' to refrain from state repression, the conclusion might be that the 'negotiated management' approach has been adopted by the entire political class – independent from party affiliation. However, Mesa's impartial nature and Morales' huge legitimacy does not allow for a valid proof of a genuine and not opportunistic self-learning process of political leaders in Bolivia.

⁶⁴ Mauricio Antezana, *Interview*, 2 June 2010, La Paz.

⁶⁵ Tom Perreault, "Popular Protest and Unpopular Policies: State Restructuring, Resource Conflict, and Social Justice in Bolivia", in *Environmental Justice in Latin America: Problems, Promise, and Practice*, ed. David V. Carruthers (Massachusetts: Institute of Technology, 2008), p. 250.

⁶⁶ According to Kohl, the military leadership chose to back Morales given his government's announcement to significantly raise salaries and the amount of military investments. The eastern departments' call for financial autonomy would have threatened the defense budget that was based on central state funds. See Benjamin Kohl, "Bolivia under Morales: A Work in Progress", *Latin American Perspectives*, 37 (2010), p. 111.

⁶⁷ John Crabtree, *Patterns of Protest. Politics and Social Movements in Bolivia* (London: Latin America Bureau, 2005), p. 28.

force of the eventually successful revolts, there was no need to consider militarization.⁶⁸ The same holds true for the most recent conflict episode triggered by the eastern departments' calls for autonomy. Given the *cruzeño* elites' lack of a paramilitary arm backing its demands to the Morales government, their struggle had to be fought within the institutional realm.⁶⁹ Overall, except for the eastern departments' incapability (and probably unwillingness) of pursuing an armed struggle against the state, the four previous episodes had shown that politicization of grievances did indeed work.

Strikingly, the politicization approach can be likewise applied to the coca-issue in Bolivia. In contrast to Peru, where this issue has been criminalized by the SL in the late 1980s, in Bolivia, the coca leaf became a highly politicized symbol of indigenous identity.⁷⁰ For instance, current President Morales is the leader of the influential *cocalero* union. In addition to mobilizing large-scale marches in the early 2000s, the *cocalero* movement was and still is able to articulate its demands through 'institutional' channels such as the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (Movement for Socialism, henceforth MAS).⁷¹ Again, the way the coca-question is dealt with in Bolivia illustrates the primacy of politicizing rather than militarizing or criminalizing demands to the state.

Internationalization of Indigenous Agenda

For the most part, conflict episodes between 2000 and 2005 were settled within national borders. This scheme changed after Morales' inauguration in January 2006, when the calls for regional autonomy by the eastern departments were voiced louder and swept beyond the national level.⁷² However, in addition to the lack of an organized paramilitary arm, the *cruzeño* leaders' separatist agenda was opposed by major external actors.⁷³ In the context of the political crisis in September 2008, the *Unión de Naciones Suramericanas* (Union of South American Nations, henceforth UNASUR) declared unambiguously its support for the Morales government and condemned the autonomy movement.⁷⁴ Thereafter, the European Union (EU) followed the UNASUR-declaration and the *Organización de los Estados Americanos* (Organization of American States, henceforth OAS) also stated its support for Morales.⁷⁵ Given the clear positioning by the international community, the threat of secessionism was no longer credible. Even more so, due to the important cooperation with Argentina and Brazil in terms of agriculture and gas export.⁷⁶ The *cruzeños*' stakes received its ultimate setback when the USA, that had

⁶⁸ Kaup, *Negotiating through nature: The resistance materiality and materiality of resistance in Bolivia's natural gas sector*, p. 1738; Mucha, *Frieden ist kein Zufall: Wie Bürgerkriege in Ägypten und Bolivien verhindert wurden*, p. 46.

⁶⁹ Wolff, *Frieden trotz Umbruch: Eine Analyse der ausbleibenden Gewalteskalation in Boliviens »demokratischer Revolution«*, pp. 235-236.

⁷⁰ Basil Riad Mahayni, *Evo Morales and the Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia: An Analysis of the 2002 and 2005 Presidential Elections* (Ann Arbor: Iowa State University, 2007), pp. 17-20.

⁷¹ Cornelius Graubner, *Drugs and Conflict. How the Mutual Impact of Illicit Drug Economies and Violent Conflict Influences Sustainable Development, Peace and Stability* (Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2007), p. 18.

⁷² Eaton, *Backlash in Bolivia*, pp. 71-102; Willem Assies, "«La Media Luna» Sobre Bolivia: Nación, Región, Etnia y Clase Social", *América Latina Hoy*, 43 (2006), pp. 87-105; Denise Humphreys Bebbington and Anthony Bebbington, "Anatomy of a Regional Conflict: Tarija and Resource Grievances in Morales's Bolivia", *Latin American Perspectives*, 37 (2010), pp. 140-160.

⁷³ Fredrik Uggla, "Bolivia: Un Año de Vivir Peligrosamente", *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 29 (2009), p. 250.

⁷⁴ Uggla, *Bolivia: Un Año de Vivir Peligrosamente*, p. 250.


⁷⁵ Uggla, *Bolivia: Un Año de Vivir Peligrosamente*, p. 250.

⁷⁶ George Gray Molina, *Bolivia's Long and Winding Road* (Washington D.C.: Inter-American Dialogue, 2008), p. 13.

traditionally supported the Bolivian elites, did position itself neither in favour nor against the autonomy movement. Washington's striking ambivalence in this question resembled its altered attitude since Morales' election a few years earlier.⁷⁷ Moreover, despite its probably indirect influence, the clear stance by the international community has to also be looked at from an Andean-unrelated perspective. Namely, the controversial Kosovo declaration of independence in February 2008 had made Western policy-makers more cautious about secessionist movements in general.⁷⁸

In summary, the years between 2000 and 2008 revealed that Bolivia was indeed highly conflictive, however, at the same time, the actors involved remained strikingly resilient to large-scale violence. Five interdependent 'peace causes' were particularly influential. These factors can be illustrated as follows:

Peace Causes in Bolivia, 2000-2008



Looking beyond the Andes, the variance of the outcome between the similarly conflict-prone Peru and Bolivia points to three dimensions of internal violent conflict that have each per se two sides of the coin (i.e. escalation or de-escalation): structural injustice, the state's share in the reproduction of

⁷⁷ Neil Burron, "Unpacking U.S. Democracy Promotion in Bolivia: From Soft Tactics to Regime Change", *Latin American Perspectives*, 39 (2012), pp. 115-117.

⁷⁸ Dawn Brancati, *Another Great Illusion: The Advancement of Separatism through Economic Integration* (St. Louis: Washington University, 2011), p. 8.

violence, and social mobilization. The following section discusses in how far the aforementioned resilience can be applied to other empirical contexts.

Generalizing Resilience

Before attempting to generalize the findings, it is important not to jump to conclusions about a seemingly violent case on the one hand and a non-violent case on the other. In both cases, escalation processes were initiated which led to conflict paths of different violence intensity. However, similarly in both cases, at some point the escalation cycles were eventually halted. Indeed, the Peruvian case experienced a set of conflict-inhibiting factors that de-escalated civil war in the 1990s. It is not of primary interest in this article, but there are surprising similarities between Peru and Bolivia with respect to peace causes.

Despite a different temporal dimension of conflict episodes – 15-year-long counterinsurgency versus short-term repression – two parallels have become apparent by comparing the reaction of the state towards the guerilla on the one hand, and the protests on the other. First, at the beginning of attacks and protests the adversaries were rather ignored and not considered by the state as equal stakeholders. The more attention the non-parliamentary opposition got or operations more severely affected the central state, the more repressive the state forces responded. However, most significantly, the violence escalation cycles were halted by the state readjusting its counter-measures. These included a bottom-up counterinsurgency approach in Peru (e.g. less indiscriminate violence, local development projects, training of local self-defense militias) and a 'negotiated management' tactic against protesters in Bolivia. Second, the importance of institutional conflict regulation was not solely believed by people in Bolivia. In Peru, too, these mechanisms were present and favored by the society since the return to democratic rule in 1980. However, the government expected to fulfill these functions only slowly regained people's legitimacy after a decade of indiscriminate repression during its counterinsurgency operations. Just in time, the military's strategic shift to 'winning hearts and minds' and the simultaneous intensification of guerilla operations to urban areas eventually won the society over to the state's side. Similar to the Bolivian case, exhausted with military rule the return to civilian government in 1980 had given people a symbol of a direct relationship with the government and of influence within it. Taking these parallels between Peru and Bolivia for granted, the state's winning over of bottom-up legitimacy eventually inhibited further violence or even de-escalated it.

Given the limited scope of this article, the following section will not attempt to generalize all of the five peace causes elaborated above. While issues of structural justice have been analyzed extensively in literature, studies on the dynamics of state response to civil unrest remain contested.⁷⁹ Thus, the following focus will be on generalizing the resilient power of two interdependent peace causes: self-learning processes and institutional conflict mechanisms. A cursory look at the popular uprising in Egypt in early 2011 will test in how far these conflict-inhibiting factors can be applied to a

⁷⁹ Jan Henryk Pierskalla, "Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 54 (2010), pp. 117-119; Witold Mucha, "Does counterinsurgency fuel civil war? Peru and Syria compared", *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 6 (2013), forthcoming.

non-Andean context. From comparative perspective, the escalation dynamics in Egypt are useful due to two specific commonalities with the Bolivian equivalent. First, a heterogeneously composed protest movement was capable of ousting the regime. Second, violent clashes were fought between the opposition forces on the one hand and the security apparatus on the other. However, these confrontations did not result in large-scale escalation or civil war.

Resilience in Egypt, 2011

Although the death toll of 846 people in a couple of weeks is high compared to the Bolivian equivalent (less than 200 in one decade), Egypt's case has been identified as a moderate 'Arab Spring Revolution'.⁸⁰ Indeed, from a regional perspective, civil wars in Libya (approximately 30.000 deaths) and currently in Syria (approximately 70.000 deaths) are characterized by a different fatality dimension. Thus, the question remains to be answered what factors inhibited a more intensive escalation in the wake of the 25 January 2011 uprising in Egypt. Altogether, a set of four de-escalatory factors can be identified that most likely have prevented the conflict to intensify further.

First, similar to the Bolivian context, the heterogeneous composition of the protest movement lacking an armed body has constrained radical parts within to pursue their struggle by violent means.⁸¹ Second, again resembling the Bolivian path, the reserved role of the armed forces during the protests and clashes with pro-Mubarak groups has contributed to the relatively pacific attitude of the masses.⁸² It is likely that a more repressive behaviour of the military might have made the activists consider arming themselves in order to defend their cause.⁸³ Given that Egyptian's army leadership supported the "legitimate demands" of the people and approved "peaceful" demonstrations in an announcement on 31 January 2011, that tolerance has probably signaled their turning away from the Mubarak regime.⁸⁴ Third, similar to the autonomy clashes in Bolivia, external pressure by regional neighbours as well as major donors of (military) aid such as the USA is likely to have contributed to Mubarak's withdrawal.⁸⁵ Notwithstanding the impact of these factors, particularly the regime's self-learning process posed a crucial peace cause. Concretely, despite Mubarak's tight lock on power revealed by initially delaying the protesters' demands in a 'stick-and-carrot' strategy, the president's eventual resignation de-escalated the conflict. By meeting the movement's primary demand, the countrywide demonstrations, strikes, and the occupation of the Tahrir Square by increasingly frustrated activists were halted. Similar to the Bolivian context, the government had learned to refrain from repressive means

⁸⁰ Ray Bush, "Briefing: Egypt: a permanent revolution?", *Review of African Political Economy*, 38 (2011), p. 303.

⁸¹ Ayman Abd El Wahab, "The January 25th Uprisings: Through or in Spite of Civil Society", *IDS Bulletin*, 43 (2012), pp. 74-77.

⁸² Jeff Martini and Julie Taylor, "Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future", *Foreign Affairs*, 127 (2011), p. 127.

⁸³ Sundus Balata, "The Egyptian Uprising", *Inquiry & Insight*, 4 (2011), p. 72.

⁸⁴ Sayed Khatab, "Egyptian Revolution and its Impact on the Stability in the Middle East", *Paper presented at the 24th Annual Conference of the International Association for Conflict Management (Istanbul, 2011)*, pp. 5-7.

⁸⁵ Robert Springborg, "Whither the Arab Spring? 1989 or 1848", *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 46 (2011), p. 9.

An excellent study on the U.S. role is provided by Marc Lynch, "America and Egypt After the Uprisings", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 53 (2011), pp. 31-42. From a background perspective, Egypt's positive socioeconomic development in the 2000s including the robust recovery from the world economic crisis in 2008 needs also to be considered when thinking about conflict-inhibiting factors.

and adhere to institutional conflict regulation. That is, a de facto resignation as prelude to elections for a constitutional assembly.

By applying the resilience perspective to the escalation threshold in February 2011, the three major conflict actors involved, that is, the government, the military, and the protest movement, had based their decisions on a similar 'adversity' perception: the longer the demands by the protesters were not met but protracted, the more frustrated, and potentially more violent they would become. Each of the stakeholders 'positively adapted' to the situation: the army's open acceptance of the protesters' demands set the other de-escalating steps in motion. The opposition increased its initially Cairo-based non-violent protests throughout the country. Finally, on 11 February, Vice-President Omar Suleiman stated that Mubarak had given up his post and transferred power to the military.⁸⁶ After dissolving both legislative councils, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) carried out the responsibilities of the president.⁸⁷

Despite repeated violence in the post-Mubarak phase (e.g. soccer riots in the city of Port Said on 1 February 2012), the former president's withdrawal and the organisation of presidential elections for May 2012 reveal the adherence to institutional conflict mechanisms. Notwithstanding the critique against the SCAF for too long holding transitional power in its hands, so far, the volatile post-Mubarak period seems to be formally handled by constitutional means. The way the public's reactions to these elections and others are handled will show in how far both the political class and the military leadership have internalized these 'self-learning processes'.⁸⁸

In sum, irrespective of future developments in Egypt, the popular uprising in early 2011 has shown a strikingly 'resilient' conflict context. This is even more striking when considering the conflict paths taken in Libya, Syria, or Yemen in the wake of the 'Arab Spring'. Indeed, this Egyptian episode indicates that resilience to large-scale violence found in Bolivia can be applied beyond the Andean region. In both contexts, the opposition had stuck to politicization rather than militarization. Institutional means had eventually de-escalated the conflict issue. Governments had 'learned' to refrain from repression in order to prevent further violence. The military had denied providing the repressive means to the governments. At last, the international community had exerted pressure on the adversaries to refrain from violence. The concluding section will briefly discuss in how far this juncture of peace causes is indeed universally applicable and even (re-)producible.

Conclusion

It seems ironic that a structural reason best explains why civil war did not happen in Bolivia between 2000 and 2008, despite apparent structural similarities with civil war-experienced Peru: the agrarian reform in 1953 had paved the way for a broad distribution of land to the indigenous

⁸⁶ Ibrahim A. Karawan, "Politics and the Army in Egypt", *Global Politics and Strategy*, 53 (2011), p. 43.

⁸⁷ Tarek Masoud (2011): "Liberty, Democracy, and Discord in Egypt", *The Washington Quarterly*, 34 (2011), pp. 118-123.

⁸⁸ Critical thoughts are given by the International Crisis Group, *Lost in Transition: The World According to Egypt's SCAF* (Cairo/ Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012).

communities in Bolivia. In contrast to Peru, where land reforms of 1969 disrupted the patron-client system in a way that made some classes of cultivators more vulnerable to subsistence crises than before and thus more susceptible to the guerilla's dogma, agrarian legislation in Bolivia enhanced the indigenous people's economic status quo (i.e. *land reform 1953*). Particularly in the marginalized rural Ayacucho department in Peru, 'comuneros' were left alone by the central state and had to endure a failed agrarian reform. This breeding ground for insurgency was taken advantage of by the well-organized SL that provided services the state was not capable or willing to provide. The delegitimizing effect of the counterinsurgency by the state relying on indiscriminate repression and the increasing involvement with cocaine traffic by the SL further played into hands of the guerilla.

Beyond the varying long-term effects of land reforms in the two Andean countries, the Bolivian escalation cycle has revealed conflict-inhibiting factors responsible for the stakeholders not crossing the threshold towards civil war between 2000 and 2008. These included the following: each of the conflict episodes was formally de-escalated by institutional mechanisms – either by withdrawal from specific laws, resignations, or elections (i.e. *institutional conflict regulation*). Closely related, the governments had 'learned' to refrain from violent repression against large-scale movements in order to prevent further violence (i.e. *self-learning*). Furthermore, the heterogeneous protest movements pursued their agendas by non-violent means. Given the eventual success of mobilization, any attempts to take up arms in order to fight the state became irrelevant. Thus, radical groups within the protest movements were taken the wind out of their sails (i.e. *politicization of conflict*). At last, in the most recent context, the unambiguous support of the current government by external actors such as the UNASUR had likewise contributed to the de-escalation of conflict (i.e. *international context*).

The application of these peace causes to the Egyptian uprising in 2011 has illustrated that the resilience patterns identified for Bolivia indeed can be found beyond the Andes. In particular, the protest movement's adherence to institutional conflict mechanisms and even more so Mubarak's resignation stand out in this regard. However, there are limits to the generalization of peace causes. While the Egyptian case supports the initially assumed Bolivian deviance to a striking extent, it cannot claim universal explanatory power to resilience and peace causes. For instance, the often crucial role of governments at the escalation peak is irrevocably dependent on the security apparatus. In most cases, this concerns the military leadership's loyalty. Taking the resignation of De Lozada in 2003 and Mubarak in 2011 as empirical examples, the argument might also be that, facing the turning away of the military, the presidents ran out of options and decided to step down before being stepped down. Thus, 'self-learning' would be a part of the de-escalation process rather than a genuine peace cause. Hence, it remains unclear in how far 'learning processes' with respect to the state's reproduction of violence are going to happen in future settings. On the one hand, the post-2003 governments in Bolivia have indeed displayed that resilience. However, on the other hand the recent Syrian and Libyan experiences show that some governments have not 'learned' in that sense but rather rely on a loyal security apparatus.⁸⁹ Thus, future studies should take a differentiated look at different levels of violence

⁸⁹ Likewise, the external support shall not be underestimated. Russia's pivotal role in constraining a harsher UN Security resolution against the Asad regime poses an illustrating example in that regard.

escalation in order to assess the impact of that peace cause.⁹⁰ In addition to this methodological challenge of selection and confirmation bias, a peace cause perspective will also have to deal with different interpretations of phenomena. In volatile contexts on the verge to violent conflict escalation, the aforementioned notion of 'institutional conflict regulation' can be claimed differently by adversaries for their own sakes. For instance, the forced removal and exile of Honduran President Zelaya in June 2009 had been justified by the military as direct order of the Supreme Court supposedly fearing Zelaya's attempt to change the constitution by referendum.⁹¹ Notwithstanding a very much divided domestic opinion, contrary to the military leaders, the international community had quickly condemned the event as a coup d'état.⁹² Hence, formally adhering to institutional principles neither does automatically imply that these principles are built on a broad societal basis nor that a given contest is fought by non-violent means.

Despite the limitations to generalization, the empirical analysis holds relevant implications to policy-makers involved with crisis prevention programs. The five peace causes have given insights into ways of dealing with structural injustice, social mobilization, and the state's role in the reproduction of violence. Given the politically favored 'operational' prevention approach, which consists of short-term measures to tackle escalation, the appeal to assisting with the implementation of land reforms, as promoted by a 'structural' prevention perspective, seems optimistic.⁹³ Thus, early warning systems and development policies alike should rather focus on the micro-dynamics of social unrest and the state's reaction towards it. For instance, while the first could include a more refined qualitative analysis of the training of police forces in the demobilization of protest, the latter could actually provide capacity building assistance. Current efforts by international donor agencies to build up police in Afghanistan pose a concrete example in that regard.⁹⁴

In any case, resilience to violent conflict remains a highly contextual phenomenon making its analysis very challenging. However, given that some of the resilience factors have indeed affected the conflict outcome in Bolivia and Egypt, a first step towards a systematic framework of peace causes is done. In consideration of more than a dozen of intrastate conflicts per year taking place at the same time around the world and a far higher number of states on the verge of civil war, the necessity for research is blatant.

⁹⁰ An excellent theoretical study on the diversity of conflict types and intensity levels is given by Charles H. Anderton and John R. Carter, *Conflict Datasets: A Primer for Academics, Policymakers, and Practitioners*, *Defence and Peace Economics*, 22 (2011), pp. 21-42.

⁹¹ Clayton M. Cunha Filho, André Luiz Coelho, and Fidel I. Pérez Flores, "A right-to-left policy switch? An analysis of the Honduran case under Manuel Zelaya", *International Political Science Review*, 34 (2013), pp. 7-8; J. Mark Ruhl, "Honduras Unravels", *Journal of Democracy*, 21 (2010), pp. 93-107; Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson and Joseph Daniel Ura, "Public opinion and conflict in the separation of powers: Understanding the Honduran coup of 2009", *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 25 (2013), pp. 105-127.

⁹² Doug Cassel, "Honduras: Coup d'Etat in Constitutional Clothing?", *The American Society of International Law Insight*, 13 (2009), pp. 1-2.

⁹³ Witold Mucha, "Prävention kollektiver Gewalt", *Gewalt. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch*, ed. Christian Gudehus, Michaela Christ, Harald Welzer, Harald (Stuttgart/ Weimar: Verlag J. B. Metzler, 2012), pp. 238-239.

⁹⁴ William B. Caldwell IV and Nathan K. Finney, *Building Police Capacity in Afghanistan: The Challenges of a Multilateral Approach* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2010).