Disarming for Peace and Development in Aceh

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Abstract

In late 2002 the Government of Indonesia and the separatist Free Aceh Movement signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) to bring an end to the nearly quarter of a century of civil war in the province. Lauded as a "golden promise to move on to a life of peace", the agreement seemed a beacon of hope for a province long accustomed to the vicious cycle of insecurity and underdevelopment. However in less than six months the peace accord had failed and martial law declared. The crucial disarmament and demilitarisation phase of the agreement disintegrated and brought a return of the hostilities present before the brokered peace deal. Examining the interrelationships between security and development, disarmament and peace, the paper explores the consequences of the prolonged armed conflict and failed disarmament on the people and communities of Aceh. First the paper presents evidence of the nexus between security and development in both the general sense and specifically in the Acehnese context. Secondly, it addresses why the disarmament phase may have failed. What could have been done differently to accomplish successful implementation? Drawing upon the best practices of disarmament programmes implemented as part of peace agreements around the world, most especially the much-heralded programme conducted by the United Nations in El Salvador, the paper analyses the Aceh disarmament phase. By comparing the cases of Aceh and El Salvador, the failure of the COHA to include recognised norms of disarmament becomes clear. The paper therefore not only underscores the

consequences of further conflict for the province as well as the country, but also presents

a possible model for restarting the peace process.

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Introduction

Located on the northern tip of Sumatra, Indonesia's largest island, and at the mouth of the vitally important Malacca Strait, sits the battlefield of one of the world's longest running separatist movements. Depending from when the line is drawn, the civil war in Aceh can be said to have begun in 1989 or as far back as 1873. The most recent conflict is often dated from 1976 with the founding of the armed resistance group Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), or Free Aceh Movement. The conflict between GAM and the Government of Indonesia (GOI) has gradually escalated over the years resulting in the deaths of thousands. Dismayed by the increase in violence, a heretofore little known international organisation, the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC)[1], began to negotiate a peace deal between the Indonesian government and the leaders of GAM. After three years of difficult consultations, on December 9, 2002 the two sides signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) declaring an end to the conflict and a commitment to disarm and demobilise.[2] Then Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri called the agreement a "golden promise to move on to a life of peace." However by the time the disarmament was to begin in February of 2003, serious problems were already emerging, and by May the process broke down completely with the GOI declaring martial law in the province on the 19 of May 2003. The humanitarian situation in the province has continued to deteriorate with the GOI extending martial law in November 2003 and then downgrading to a state of emergency in May 2004.

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[1] Previously known as the Henry Dunant Centre, the organization changed its name in 2002.
[2] The text of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement can be found in the United States Institute of Peace's Peace Agreement Digital Collection at <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/aceh/aceh_12092002.htm>.

Though there are certainly distinctive elements to the Acehnese situation, it is also a prototypical case of one of the many intrastate conflicts that have proliferated in the post-Cold War political landscape. Fueled by uncertainty in the new international system, the global circulation of war remnants from Cold War arsenals, and long-standing ethnic, religious, social, and/or economic disparities, intra-state conflicts have become increasingly commonplace. In the years 1990-2002 there were 58 major conflicts recorded in 46 locations around the world;[3] only three of those conflicts were interstate – between Iraq and Kuwait, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Pakistan and India. The year 2003 recorded 19 major armed conflicts, with the majority of their beginnings dating from before 1990s.[4] Aceh ranks among the most persistent and deadly.

Throughout this time of increasing conflicts, there have also been moves to broaden the term security and redefine what issues threaten national security, as well as a growing need for the international community to address global developmental issues. In September 2000 the member states of the United Nations pledged to work towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to eradicate poverty, improve education opportunities, increase maternal and child health and facilitate sustainable development for all people of the world.[5] However in areas of the world engulfed in conflict such as

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[3] Stockholm International Peace Research Foundation (SIPRI), *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 109. A major armed conflict is defined as a conflict where the "use of armed force between two or more organized armed groups resulting in the battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people in any single year and in which incompatibility concerns control of government, territory, or communal identity," p. 87.

[4] *SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 132-135.

[5] The eight Millennium Development Goals are 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2. Achieve universal primary education, 3. Promote gender equality and empower women, 4. Reduce child mortality, 5. Improve maternal health, 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 7. Ensure environment

Aceh, meeting the MDGs is made even more difficult as humanitarian and development projects are unable to reach populations in need due to the prolonged and persistent violence. Because the majority of these intrastate conflicts also occur in developing countries, the understanding of the interrelationship between the fields of security and development becomes all the more indispensable in development policy formation and programme implementation. The presence of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in conflicts not only contributes to numerous deaths and injuries, but also results in many indirect consequences for communities such as forced displacement and a disruption in health and education services. Acute costs of war such as loss of life and physical injury contribute to chronic personal and social deficiencies that hinder community development that then further feeds the continuation of the conflict. The more protracted the conflict, the more insidious the cycle of insecurity and underdevelopment. Such a cycle has cost many lives and livelihoods of the Acehnese people. The incidence of armed conflict in Aceh has contributed to numerous human security threats such as population displacement, loss of property, fear of physical violence and the intimidation of humanitarian and human rights workers, as well as dysfunctional development in the province.

There is a dual purpose to this paper. First is to examine the linkages between disarmament in conflict resolution and the establishment of levels of security that positively affect development. The paper will systematically outline these links between security and development, disarmament and peace, examining both the direct and indirect

sustainability, and 8. Develop a global partnership for development. The UN is committed to meeting these goals by the year 2015. <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>.

developmental consequences of prolonged armed violence. This is augmented with a section on the necessity of including disarmament provisions in conflict resolution strategies based on best practices gleaned from international community involvement in numerous conflicts worldwide. Following this the paper takes a specific look at the consequences of war in Aceh. Then, after understanding the crucial role of disarmament, the disarmament provisions present in the Acehnese COHA are evaluated. The COHA is compared with the peace agreement in El Salvador using established international norms for disarmament in peace processes. The paper concludes with a brief assessment of the current situation in Aceh and the developmental consequences of further conflict for the province as well as the country as a whole.

Security & Development, Disarmament & Peace

It is important to understand and illustrate the nexus between security and development and also disarmament's role in achieving both peace and a level of security sufficient to achieve sustainable development. Before going further, it is essential to define the terms. What exactly is meant by security, development, disarmament and peace? Security has come to have an increasing number of connotations since the end of the Cold War. Security, from the micro-level of individual human security to the macro-level of national security, deteriorates in an environment of armed conflict and violence. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called human security that which "encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that

each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her potential" and further it means "[f]reedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment - these are the interrelated building blocks of human - and therefore national – security."[6] Development has often been understood as the progress and advancement of a nation's economic vitality, yet the term has come to mean much more than economic growth, but also encompasses "environmental stability and efforts to tackle social inequality and poverty in an integrated and balanced way,"[7] and indeed often the existence of good governance to guide such transformation. Disarmament, which will be more fully defined below, need not be the collection and destruction of all SALW. In actuality that would be nearly impossible to accomplish due to the many legal and legitimate uses of weapons as well as cultural factors. Therefore disarmament represents only the collection of a *significant* number of weapons to achieve a target goal to end conflict and restore security. Peace here refers to the end of conflict.

In recent years international humanitarian organisations have come to accept the inextricable link between security and development.[8] The United Nations has certainly recognised the difficulty in implementing development programmes in insecure environments.[9] UN agencies such as the UNHCR and UNDP have adopted a

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[6] Kofi Annan, "Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on Human Security in Mongolia," *UN Press Release SG/SM/7382* <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000508.sgsm7382.doc.html> [14 December 2004].
[7] Owen Greene, "How is SALW Control a Development Issue?" Background Paper for Wilson Park Conference on Integrating SALW Controls into Development Programmes, Bradford University, April 10, 2003.
[8] *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 150.
[9] For example in the UN Secretary-General's reports on "Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration," peace, security and development are jointly addressed. See also, Robert Muggah and Peter Batchelor, "'Development Held Hostage': Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on

development policy of *security first* that **"**recognizes that without the achievement of relative levels of security there can be no sustainable development, and conversely, without meaningful socio-economic development there can be a relapse into conflict and crisis. The establishment of a secure environment for development cannot be accomplished in a society that is fraught with arms."[10] Disarmament if often a key component to creating that "security first" environment.

It is perhaps easier to identify the problems related to the inverse of security and development, that of insecurity and underdevelopment. Insecurity leads to both direct and indirect developmental costs. Table 1 outlines just some of the possible short-term and long-term impacts of armed conflict, from the individual to the national level. Starting with the direct impact of mortal injury, an estimated fifty percent of conflict-related deaths are attributed to SALW.[11] The costs of non-fatal injuries are more difficult to determine, but the drain on personal and community resources to treat acute and permanent injuries and the long-term losses of productivity are potentially crippling.[12] There are a wide range of indirect impacts from forced displacement, leading to large refugee flows and/or internally displaced persons (IDPs), to local and foreign disinvestment in the affected area. For example women, a group particularly vulnerable in armed conflicts, become targets for sexual attack and suffer declines in social and economic standing with the loss of their husband and children.[13] Incidence of armed

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Human Development," April 2002
<http://www.undp.org/bcpr/smallarms/docs/development_held_hostage.pdf>.
[10] UNDP, "UNDP & Small Arms Control and Reduction: a Primer,"
<http://www.undp.org/bcpr/smallarms/undp3_prim.htm>.
[11] *Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 157.
[12] Muggah and Batchelor, pp, 19-22.
[13] *Small Arms Survey 2002*, p.172.

violence correlates to a parallel decline in public services and an increase in child mortality rates.[14] The reallocation of health budgets to military programmes, destruction of health care facilities, intimidation of medical workers, and disruption in the delivery of medical supplies, contributes to a downward spiral of a community's ability to adequately deal with a myriad of health concerns. [15] Conflict-related health problems go far beyond mortality and visible injury rates, with frequent interruption of water supplies and sewage disposal also contributing to higher morbidity. Mental distress and psychosomatic disorders are also more common amongst communities exposed to armed conflict. Protracted underdevelopment can become in and of itself a cause for continued conflict.[16]

The Importance of DDR in Conflict Resolution

The United Nations defines the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration or DDR terms as the following[17]:

Disarmament: The collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population.

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[14] *Small Arms Survey 2002*, p. 173, *Small Arms Survey 2003*, pp. 140-141.

[15] Antonio Ugalde et al., "Conflict and Health: The Health Costs of War: Can they be Measured? Lessons from El Salvador," *British Medical Journal* 321, 7254 (2000), pp. 169-172.

[16] See for example, S. Neil MacFarlane, "Security and Development in the Caucasus," *Conflict, Security and Development* 4, 2 (2004), pp. 133-148.

[17] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: United Nations, 2000) <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/DD&R.pdf> (26 November 2003), p. 15.

Demobilization: The process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace.

Reintegration: Assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their and their families' economic and social reintegration into civil society.

DDR have become an essential if not critical component in conflict resolution strategies. The failure to incorporate such strategies often lays the stage open for an easy return to conflict and violence. In the short term, the availability of weapons and idle ex-combatants often contributes to a relapse of hostilities. Over the long term these factors may produce a society characterised by high armed-crime rates. Peace agreements are often time sensitive and fragile plans. The slightest perceived mistake, the smallest doubt by either side may easily plunge a war-weary population back into conflict. Through years of experience in a dozens of conflicts around the world, the international community has found the greater success stories are those that integrate comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants programmes into the peace plan. In peace agreements DDR needs to be a priority. They do in fact form a "natural continuum," an ideal process toward peace: when disarmament activities end, then demobilisation and reintegration programmes begin.[18]

The Critical Phase: Disarmament

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[18] United Nations, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: An Essential Component to Peacekeeping," *Press Kit Fact Sheet 8*< http://www.un.org/events/peacekeepers/docs/ddr.htm> (26 November 2003).

Disarmament is perhaps the most difficult part of the peace process. In surveys of personnel involved in United Nations peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Somalia, disarmament ranked almost across the board as very important to the success of the mission.[19] Despite this it is often overlooked by agencies in a rush to end a conflict and implement later stages such as reintegration of ex-combatants or to begin development programmes. In Iraq, for instance, the importance of SALW collection has been for the most part disregarded despite efforts to begin reconstruction, thereby severely restraining the development process due to poor security.[20] In Afghanistan too, the delay in the implementation of DDR programmes has had significant security repercussions for restoring order in the country.[21] This has also been seen in East Timor where the push for development has overwhelmed any real measures to disarm. This can have consequences in the post-conflict stage, especially if demobilisation and reintegration phases are also rushed, in that remaining weapons will often be used for criminal purposes.

Disarmament is also difficult in that it is not only the first stage toward building confidence in the peace process, but also a phase that relies heavily on the trust and political will of the parties involved. Outside mediators and NGOs have less control per se over the disarmament process than perhaps in the demobilisation and reintegration phases, in the sense that the onus for compliance is placed on the factions disarming. In

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[19] See the United Nations' *Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project – Managing Arms in Peace Processes* for Nicaragua and El Salvador, Cambodia, Haiti, and Somalia.

[20] Rachel Stohl, "Iraq Small Arms are a Big Threat,"*Christian Science Monitor* 5 November 2003. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1105/p09s02-coop.htm> (12 November 2003).

[21] Carlotta Gall, "Disarming of Afghans Called Vital to Security," *New York Times* 26 October 2003.

intra-state conflicts, the insurgent group is often battling against the state military. Depending on the situation, it may be difficult for insurgents to surrender their weapons without guarantees from the government and/or mediators that they will be safe to do so. In a protracted war, the weapons may have become part of the identity of the combatant and a symbol of the cause he/she has been fighting for. It is extremely difficult to surrender such an identity. Both the Northern Ireland and Sri Lankan peace processes have been stalled for years in the disarmament phase.

The international community has, over years of experience, determined guidelines for successful disarmament in peace building. First and foremost DDR must embody a central part of the peace agreement. Secondly, the framework for DDR strategies should be as detailed and comprehensive as possible in the agreement. Although successful disarmament is not an exact science, the following aspects should be stated as clearly as possible in the agreement:

- Weapons assessment. Prior to disarmament it is essential to determine the stock of arms and ammunition, the specific types of weapons available, those who possess the weapons and how they obtained them. Without this information the success of any weapons collection programme is difficult to determine.

- Target Audiences. Who is to be disarmed? The military? Insurgent groups? The public? All of the above?

- Targeted Items. Disarmament needs to be defined in each context; it does not always signify the collection of all weapons. What then is the goal of the disarmament process? To build confidence between parties in their commitment

toward the agreement? To decrease the availability and visibility of armed weapons? To increase awareness of the violence perpetrated with such weapons? Based on the numbers ascertained during assessment, what is the target number and type of weapons to be collected that will achieve this goal?

- Timetable. It is essential that a clear but flexible timetable for the commencement and conclusion of disarmament be included. The timing for the beginning of disarmament is also critical. It should begin at the earliest possible stage; if possible directly after the signing of the agreement because the immediate "shock of peace" creates favourable conditions and attitudes towards disarmament. Waiting too long can cause security and trust to deteriorate and make a return to conflict more likely.

- Inducements. Is the disarmament by command or voluntary? If voluntary, what incentives are offered for people to turn in their arms?

- Collection Sites. The number and location of sites should be established. They should be located in areas easily accessible and secure to those participating in the programme. There should be space available to store weapons and ammunition securely. The issue of who should staff the collection sites should also be taken into consideration as sometimes the presence of police or military will put off combatants from turning over weapons.

- Disposal of the Collected Weaponry. Once arms have been collected, how then will they be disposed of? Collected weapons can be transferred to the government, sold off, or destroyed. The third option is often preferred, especially in situations where the government is one of the warring parties. Combatants

would then be more likely to turn in weapons if they know they will be destroyed. Public ceremonies held to destroy weapons can create an atmosphere of completion for the community, a sense of having moved beyond conflict. Weapons can be used for monuments or museums celebrating the struggle for peace, then in the past.

Insecurity & Underdevelopment in Aceh

The conflict in Aceh, although labeled primarily as a separatist movement, is a war about a series of broken promises expressed through a combination of economic exploitation leading to gross underdevelopment of the province and human rights abuses against the Acehnese people.[22]   In Aceh both insecurity and underdevelopment have served as cause and effect for the protracted fighting.   Despite repeated defeats at the hands of the Indonesian military, GAM has continued to return to take up arms and has overtime developed greater support amongst the greater Acehnese population.

There have been three phases of GAM's resistance. After its founding in 1976, the group began to target Western companies contracted by the Indonesian government to tap the oil and natural gas reserves in the province. The government responded with heavy-

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[22] To read more about the conflict in Aceh see: Anthony Smith, "Conflict in Aceh: The Consequences of a Broken Social Contract," *Harvard Asia Quarterly* 6, no. 1 (2002), pp. 47-55; Edward Aspinall, "Sovereignty, the Successor State, and Universal Human Rights: History and the International Structuring of Acehnese Nationalism." *Indonesia* 73 (2002): 1-24; Tim Kell, *The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992*. New York: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1995; and Anthony Reid, "War, Peace and the Burden of History in Aceh." *Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series No. 1*, June 2003. <http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps03_001.pdf> (30 September 2003).

handed military force against GAM. By 1982, much of GAM's ranks had been decimated; its leaders either killed or forced into exile. There have been three phases of GAM's resistance. After its founding in 1976, the group began to target Western companies contracted by the Indonesian government to tap the oil and natural gas reserves in the province. The government responded with heavy-handed military force against GAM. By 1982, much of GAM's ranks had been decimated; its leaders either killed or forced into exile. In 1989, a rejuvenated GAM made its reappearance in the province. Predictably, the Indonesian government again met the challenge with brutal force. Most of the fighting occurred between 1989 and 1992, but the government placed Aceh under *Daerah Operasi Militer* (DOM), or Military Operations Area from 1989 to 1998. Although GAM went underground from 1992, gross human rights abuses were conducted by the military throughout the DOM period. In 1998, with the fall of Suharto and the lifting of DOM, overseas Acehnese, many in Malaysia, began to return to the province. The January 1999 announcement by President Habibie on East Timor's referendum caused a surge of hope throughout Aceh that a similar referendum might be called in their case. It was in this charged political environment that GAM recommenced its resistance activities. Although negotiations for a peaceful resolution began in January of 2000, and several humanitarian pauses were called, the conflict remained fairly constant until the signing of the COHA in December of 2002.

The conflict in Aceh has developed along with the evolution of GAM's fighting capacity and support base. When GAM first came on the scene in 1976, it was a small group of some 70 ill-equipped fighters with only a small support base in the district of

Pidie.[23] The political and economic causes of the rebellion had not gone away when GAM resurfaced in 1989. As a result, the sympathy and popular support for the movement had grown. Its support base expanded beyond Pidie to Aceh Besar, Central Aceh, and North and East Aceh, and it was active in three of these districts.[24] Still GAM had only around 750 lightly armed fighters compared to the 12,000 soldiers sent by Jakarta to counter the uprising.[25] The brutal counterinsurgency campaign launched by GOI against GAM, including the use of "shock therapy," only served to bring more civilians to the side of GAM.[26] Again when GAM returned to prominence in 1998, the years of Indonesian military abuses under DOM, in addition to East Timor's referendum on independence, only increased public backing for the cause.

Over the course of the conflict from 1976 to 2002, an estimated 12,000 had been killed; many of the victims non-combatants. The majority of these deaths occurred in the period beginning with the DOM in 1989 to 1992 and since 1999, with the conflict growing more deadly each year.[27] Although both sides have been implicated in killings and abuse, it is often the Indonesian military that is blamed for the greater part. Many of the victims suffered torture at the hands of their assailants before being killed. Two of the most shocking incidents occurred on May 3, 1999 and July 23, 1999 when in the first instance soldiers opened fire on protestors in Lhokseumawe killing scores of people and wounding perhaps a hundred more; the second incident at a Muslim boarding school in

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[23] Schulze, "The Struggle for an Independent Aceh," p. 256.

[24] Kell, *The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion*, p. 66.

[25] Kell, *The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion*, p. 74.

[26] At her August 2001 state of the nation address, President Megawati Sukarnoputri apologized to the people of Aceh for human rights abuses committed in the province under previous administrations.

[27] Estimates are that approximately 1,000 people were killed in the first three years of DOM from 1989-1992. Between 1999 and 2002, there were approximately 4,750 killed in Aceh, with the number climbing each year: 1999: 400; 2000: 850; 2001: 1,500; 2002: 2,000.

which 56 students and 1 teacher were murdered and thrown into a mass grave. During

DOM, the Indonesian military employed a technique known as "shock therapy," also

used in East Timor, in which bodies of tortured and murdered victims were placed in

public places along roadsides for instance as a warning to future resisters.[28] Since the

resumption of martial law and a military offensive by the government in May 2003,

approximately 2300 Acehnese have been killed in the crackdown.[29] Despite the virtual

hiatus from armed clashes up until Jakarta launched the May 19 offensive, the casualties

in Aceh increased by over 50 percent in 2003 over the previous year.[30] In fact Aceh was

one of the six major armed conflicts in 2003 that directly lead to at least 1000 deaths.

Killings on both sides continue almost daily despite the downgrading of martial law to a

state of emergency on May 19, 2004.

The people of Aceh have also faced other forms of physical harm and intimidation as a

result of the violence. Women and girls have been raped or subjected to other forms of

sexual abuse in Aceh.[31] Following the DOM period, some women began to join GAM in

fighting, and they form a small but special battalion known as *Pasukan Inong Bale,* or

"Children of Widows".[32] Children have also been killed and abused in the conflict, but

more often than not are indirectly affected by the loss of their parents, forced

displacement, or even lack of schooling opportunities when their schools close or are

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[28] See Amnesty International, *Indonesia: "Shock Therapy": Restoring Order in Aceh 1989-1993*, (New York: Amnesty International, 1993).
[29] Sian Powell, "Jakarta Rules Aceh off Limits," *Australian* 15 November 2004
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,11387417%255E2703,00.html> [17 November 2004].
[30] *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, p. 139.
[31] See Amnesty International, *Indonesia: The Impact of Impunity on Women in Aceh*, (New York: Amnesty International, 2000).
[32] Schulze, "The Struggle for an Independent Aceh," p. 255.

burned down.[33] Some children have even joined GAM.[34] Forced displacement has been

of particular concern in Aceh since 1998.[35] Some have fled to nearby Malaysia seeking

asylum, while many are displaced in Aceh and surrounding provinces. In July 2003

following the resumption of military violence in the province, internally displaced

persons in Aceh reached a peak of 90,000.[36] In another realm that affects the human

security of Aceh's population, human rights and humanitarian workers have in recent

years become the target of intimidation, injury, and murder in Aceh.[37]

Aceh is not a poor province. It is rich in natural resources such as oil, natural gas,

timber and fertile land for cash crops. Aceh is ranked nationally as the fourth or fifth

richest province in the archipelago.[38] The Indonesian government exports approximately

$1.3 billion worth of oil and gas from Aceh each year,[39] providing nearly one-fifth of the

country's total export earnings. How much of those profits trickle down to the average

Acehnese however is not really known as the majority of the population continues to rely

on the agricultural sector, and in the current environment of severe conflict it is difficult

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[33] See Amnesty International, *Indonesia: A Cycle of Violence for Aceh's Children*, (New York: Amnesty International, 2000).

[34] Amnesty International, *Indonesia: A Cycle of Violence for Aceh's Children*, pp. 6-7. Schulze, "The Struggle for an Independent Aceh," p. 255. The children are referred to as *anak korban dom*, or "children of the victims of DOM".

[35] See Jana Mason, *Shadow Plays: The Crisis of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Indonesia*; ; U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey 2004*, section on Indonesia's situation available at <http://www.refugees.or/wrs04/country_updates/east_asia_pacific/indonesia.html>. As of June 2004 the May 2003 military offensive had displaced 123,000 people in Aceh, Global IDP Database, Indonesian profile <http://www.db.idpproject.org>. For the situation with the refugees in Malaysia see *The 'Least Risky Solution': Malaysia's Detention and Deportation of Acehnese Asylum Seekers*. U.S. Committee for Refugees, December 1998 and "Top 10 Refugee Hot Spots", *World Refugee Survey 2004*, p. 2.

[36] Global IDP database, "Over 600,000 IDPs Still Wait to Return."

[37] See Amnesty International, *Indonesia: Activists at Risk in Aceh* (New York: Amnesty International, 2000), Amnesty International, *Indonesia: Acehnese Human Rights Defenders Under Attack* (New York: Amnesty International, 2000), and Mason, *Shadow Plays*, p. 13.

[38] World Bank, "Promoting Peaceful Development in Aceh: An Informal Background Paper Prepared for the Preparatory Conference on Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh," 3 December 2002. <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2002/wb-indo-03dec.pdf> (20 October 2003).

[39] SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2002*, p. 47.

to access reliable information of any sort. However in 1999-2000, 10.15 percent and 16.30 percent of Aceh's urban and rural population lived below Indonesia's already low poverty-line.[40] The 2000 Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia provides little developmental information, as it surprisingly does not provide information such as infant mortality or average life expectancy. In addition, where it does provide data of interest, such as income and unemployment levels or educational attainment it is listed by region and not by province, so one cannot determine where Aceh stands in comparison with other provinces. One interesting table however does indicate that injuries from natural disasters are significantly higher in Aceh than in the rest of Indonesia.[41] In 1999 and 2000, there were 48, 628 and 593, 209 injuries in Aceh respectively as a result of natural disasters. That represents 21.7% and 50% of all such injuries recorded in Indonesia that year. The table does not provide information on what constitutes a natural disaster, nor reasons for the injuries, but it can be inferred the security situation in Aceh may have caused disruption to services to populations in need following such disasters.

According to a World Bank study in preparation for the reconstruction of Aceh following the signing of the COHA in December 2002, the conflict has had serious developmental consequences for the Acehnese population. Using data from a 1999 national social economic household survey (last conducted in Aceh in 1999 due to the conflict), 12.3% of households in Aceh are headed by females, compared to the 8.3% national average. Although the Acehnese reported higher levels of education and lower levels of financial poverty than the national average, they scored lower in other critical

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[40] Lenard Milich, "Civil Society Breakdown: Food Security in the 'New' Indonesia," *Development* 44, 4 (2001), p. 96.
[41] *Statistik Indonesia, Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 2000* (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2001), p. 106.

areas. People in Aceh were less likely to have electricity or access to safe drinking water. In addition, the poor in Aceh report being sick more often and are less likely to seek professional care. Student and teacher attendance is lower in Aceh than the national average. It is unsurprising that the investment climate has also deteriorated with the increase in violence. Many goods cannot make it to market because insecurity on the roads has led to irregular deliveries and higher transportation costs. As a consequence some foods are scarce and food prices have risen sharply.[42] Food security has become an acute problem in the province.[43] Due to chronic forced displacements and fear of being exposed to violence while tending fields, many farmers have largely abandoned their land. Many families desperate for income have turned to the more reliable trade in illegal logging, which not only leads to degradation of the environment but also reduces the quality of the very land needed to grow crops, further worsening the already tenuous food security. The violence in Aceh has most certainly negatively affected development prospects on several levels. Most likely the situation has only grown worse since the resumption of the government's military offensive in Aceh. Humanitarian organisations have, in addition to the international media, been restricted to the Achenese capital Banda Aceh.

The costs of conflict reach beyond the confines of Aceh province. Since 1975, the Indonesian government has spent an estimated US$28 billion on internal conflicts.[44] Though this certainly includes actions in East Timor, Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) and

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[42] Kate McGeown, "Caught in Aceh's Crossfire," *BBC News* 28 May 2003
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2944110.stm> (13 November 2003).
[43] Milich, "Civil Society Breakdown: Food Security in the 'New' Indonesia,"p. 96.
[44] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IIAS), *2003 Chart of Armed Conflict*, available with the IISS *Military Balance 2003-2004* (London: Oxford University Press, 2003). US$ are set at 1995 figures.

other areas of unrest in the country besides Aceh, the figure is indicative of the financial drain internal conflicts have on Indonesian coffers. On average this is an outlay of US$1.2 billion a year. Additionally, Jakarta dispatched as many as 35,000 military troops and 14,000 police officers to deal with the estimated 4,000 armed GAM insurgents. With Indonesia's active military forces estimated at 302,000 this represents more than 10 percent of their total forces.[45] The 14,000 police officers signify the same numbers as the entire mobile police unit (BRIMOB). These figures represent a serious diversion of Indonesia's resources which could potentially be used for development programmes throughout the country. Also, although the figures are not reported as often as the deaths of GAM agents or civilians, the Indonesian forces have also suffered heavy losses in the Aceh conflict.

Disarmament in the Peace Process: El Salvador & Aceh

The El Salvadoran Peace Agreement and Disarmament

El Salvador is presented here in comparison because it has been considered one of the most successful disarmament exercises in conflict resolution to date. It presents a case where the disarmament procedures were put into practice and worked (see Table 2 for a matrix of policy variables of the two cases). Although some might feel a regional comparison more appropriate, the root causes – ethnic, religious, social inequalities

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[45] IISS, *Military Balance 2003-2004*, pp. 156-157.

expressed through political and/or territorial disputes – and proximate causes – the cycle of insecurity and underdevelopment – are very similar in many intrastate conflicts, though certainly they may be aggravated by local and regional dimensions. Like Aceh, El Salvador was a protracted intrastate conflict ended with a peace agreement brokered and implemented by an outside third party. The roots of El Salvador's civil war lay in the dissatisfaction with a government, which perpetuated a long-standing social and economic system benefiting only a small group of elites. There was also widespread discontent over violent abuses performed by the country's security forces. An October 1979 military coup only exacerbated the poor human rights situation, and 1980 saw the first rumblings of conflict. By January 1981, the situation had degenerated into all-out war.

Exacerbated by Cold War power politics (with weapon support from both the United States and the U.S.S.R) and similar clashes in the neighbouring countries of Nicaragua and Guatemala, the conflict was to last 12 years. In that period an estimated 75,000 people were killed, an average of 17 a day, and over a million people driven from their homes to become refugees or internally displaced persons. At the macro level, the civil war aggravated an already shaky economic situation, devastated the country's physical infrastructure, and retarded development. Of course the poor economic performance affected everyone in the country, and the standard of living dropped to half of what it was

before the beginning of the war.[46] The country suffered major losses in social and economic development that are still being felt today.[47]

On January 16, 1992, the El Salvadorian government and the coalition of resistance fighters, the Farabundo Frente Marti de Liberacion Nacional (FMLN), under the auspices of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), signed a landmark agreement formally ending their twelve-year civil war and ushering in the lengthy transition towards peace. The agreement was the fruit of many years of difficult negotiations beginning at the regional and national levels.[48] It was not without its setbacks, but through the perseverance of both sides the hope for peace gradually became a reality. The comprehensive agreement carefully detailed the DDR process. Here the disarmament components of the agreement will be outlined according to the criteria listed above:

- *Weapons Assessment.* Both the El Salvadorian troops and FMLN were to supply ONUSAL with detailed information on their numbers of combatants, weapons, and other war related materials. Initially there was lack of cooperation, but eventually under pressure from ONUSAL, observers were able to count and register all weapons held by FMLN.

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[46] Paulo S. Wrobel, *Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project-Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Nicaragua and El Salvador* (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1997), p. 125.

[47] World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, "The Economic and Social Consequences of Armed Conflict in El Salvador," January 2003 <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/TheEconomicandSocialCostsofArmedConflictinElSalvador/$FILE/ElSalvadorNote8.pdf>.

[48] To read in detail the negotiation processes see Wrobel, *Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project*, pp. 117-129; United Nations, *The United Nations and El Salvador 1990-1195* (New York: United Nations, 1995), pp. 6-34; and Barbara Messing, "El Salvador" in *Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict*, ed. Melanie C. Greenberg, John H. Barton and Margaret E. McGuinness (New York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), pp. 161-181.

- *Target Audiences.* Both sides were involved in disarmament and demobilisation with the complete disbandment of the FMLN and the reduction in size of the El Salvadorian military. Once mobilised in the designated sites, they were not allowed to leave without ONUSAL permission.

- *Target Items.* In the designated mobilisation sites, all weapons and military equipment, with the exception of the personal rifle and equipment of the combatant, were locked into special deposit locations. The personal rifles and other equipment kept by the combatants were surrendered when they left the sites for reintegration.

- *Timetable.* The ceasefire began on February 1, 1992. The armed conflict was then to end formally on October 31, 1992. The separation of forces was to begin 5 days into the ceasefire, with FMLN withdrawing to 15 designated sites in the former conflict zones. In addition over the following 24 days the El Salvadorian armed forces were to gradually fall back to peacetime positions. The FMLN reintegration was to be carried out in five stages between 1 May and 31st of October, with twenty percent officially returning to civilian life each month. Eventually this timetable was extended but demobilisation was completed by 15 December 1992. The reduction of the El Salvadorian troops to approximately half their war-time size was to be completed by January 1994.

- *Inducements.* Initially there were no goods or cash offered for weapons. It was not the job of ONUSAL to disarm Salvadorian society. Following the end of the ONUSAL mission, a goods for guns programme was implemented. However during the mission, the primary incentives to disarm were to make the

return to peace and execute a number of changes in the political and military system of El Salvador. In a previous agreement endorsed in Mexico City on 27 April 1991, the two sides agreed to a package of reforms including a reorganisation and subordination to civilian authority of the armed forces and police, and restructuring of the political and electoral systems. There was also a programme for the redistribution of land.

- *Collection Sites.* On site at demobilisation areas.

- *Disposal of Collected Weaponry.* Originally all surrendered weapons of the FMLN were to be destroyed under the sole supervision of ONUSAL between the 15 and 31 of October.

While the peace process was far from perfect, and at times timetables needed to be renegotiated, one of the great strengths of the El Salvadorian peace agreement is that it not only sought to end the conflict through comprehensive DDR programmes, but it also addressed the root causes of the conflict. Even before the signing of the final peace agreement, an agreement on human rights was signed in San Jose, Costa Rica on 26 July 1990. By July of 1991, the UN had set up a Human Rights Mission to investigate human rights abuses. The peace agreement included the formation of a political party for the former FMLN and reforms in the political, judicial, and security sectors, and the establishment of a Commission on the Truth to investigate serious acts of violence committed throughout the conflict.

The Acehnese Peace Agreement and Disarmament[49]

In late 1999, two leaders of an Aceh-based GAM faction indicated interest in negotiating with the Indonesian government.[50] In January of 2000 the Geneva-based NGO the HDC contacted the Indonesian government and GAM to offer its assistance in mediating the conflict. It was an opportune time as President Wahid had already appeared open to a political solution and he agreed to the mediation by the HDC. The following month the first round of discussions began in Geneva although neither side met face to face. However by May the two sides had agreed on a three-month ceasefire, or "humanitarian pause", to begin in June. The ceasefire was extended in September and again through the following year. Although the violence on the ground never really abated and was in fact worse than ever, the negotiations were nevertheless a historic step forward for both parties. Never before had both sides agreed to negotiation or agreed to jointly end hostilities. The talks culminated with the extraordinary signing of the COHA on December 9, 2002.

There was to be a two-month period for confidence building before disarmament of GAM and the demilitarisation of the Indonesian forces in the province were scheduled to begin on February 9, 2002. The Joint Security Council (JSC), whose function it was to investigate reports on incidents in violation of the agreement, was formed on the 20th of December. In two unexpected but significant events, the JSC handed down sanctions to

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[49] Much of this section is drawn from confidential interviews conducted with two individuals closely involved with and knowledgeable about the peace agreement and implementation as well as the situation on the ground in Aceh. Confidential Interview 1, conducted by phone November 20, 2003. Confidential Interview 2, conducted via email, received responses December 2, 2003.

[50] Rizal Sukma, "The Acehnese Rebellion: Secessionist Movement in Post-Suharto Indonesia," in *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia*, ed. Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), p. 396.

both GAM and the GOI in seven incidents.[51] The first of the unarmed international monitoring teams, to ultimately be comprised of 48 international members, 48 officials of the GOI, and 48 members of GAM, arrived in Aceh at the end of December, with the second and third contingents arriving in January and February respectively. The first of the Peace Zones, areas where no weapons are allowed and humanitarian assistance would be concentrated, was established at Indrapuri, Aceh Besar on 20 December 2002. A further four such zones were inaugurated by the beginning of March. After so much conflict the people of Aceh really enjoyed the freedom from fear in these zones.[52]

Despite much jubilation by the Acehnese and a significant reduction in violence in the initial phase, neither party was prepared to begin the second phase in February. The date was then rescheduled for 9 March. The problem lay in that the day for disarmament to begin was the same time in which parties submitted their plans for conducting the disarmament phase. Despite the long animosity between the groups, HDC did not initially see this as a problem. However after the failure of either GAM to turn over any weapons or the GOI forces to fall back to defensive positions after the 9th of March, the prospect for completion of the agreement began to falter. The GOI already began making plans to launch its military offensive into Aceh, despite GAM's attempts to continue the talks. Almost immediately after the talks were suspended, the armed forces of the GOI launched its most deadly offensive to date.

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[51] International Crisis Group, "Aceh: A Fragile Peace." *ICG Asia Report No. 47*, 27 February 2003. <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/asia/indonesia/reports/A400907_27022003.pdf> (22 October 2003), pp. 10-11.
[52] Confidential interview 2.

This section will now examine the COHA in terms of the internationally recognised criteria for disarmament in conflict resolution:

- *Weapons assessment.* Although the HDC did hire two disarmament specialists, no assessment was conducted of the exact numbers of the weapons or combatants of GAM.

- *Targeted Audience.* Both GOI forces and GAM. According to Article 3b of the COHA – "After peace zones have been identified, the GAM will designate placement sites for its weapons. Two months after the signing of the COH and as confidence grows, GAM will begin the phased placement of its weapons, arms and ordinance in the designated sites. The JSC will also decide on a simultaneous phased relocation of TNI forces which will reformulate their mandate from a strike force to a defensive force."

- *Targeted Items.* Expectation of all GAM weapons, with 20% to be surrendered each month. Yet without prior weapons assessment, there is no indication of how this might be achieved.

- *Timeline.* The only mention of timing in the agreement is the beginning of disarmament two months after the signing of the agreement. Article 5 is actually entitled "Time Frames" yet it only indicates "all acts of violence should cease forever in Acheh [sic]" and "Both sides also agree that hostilities and all acts of violence during the first three months from the time when the JSC and the monitoring team(s) become operational are very crucial as indicator of the seriousness of the commitment from both sides."

- *Inducements.* None were designated in the agreement, but the HDC indicates the incentive for GAM was to take accountability and appear credible to the international community.

- *Collection Sites.* GAM designated 32 sites for weapons placement, and some preliminary unilateral missions were sent by HDC in early March to verify the structures were in place to fulfill GAM's commitments.

- *Disposal of Collected Weapons.* No indication of what to do with weapons after collected and stored was given.

In order to better illustrate the comparison between the El Salvadoran and Acehnese disarmament provisions see Table 3. The categories of "who" "what" "when" "where" and "how" correspond to the internationally accepted disarmament practices already discussed. "Who" refers to the targeted audiences and who would verify the collection of the targeted weapons; "what" indicates the inducements for the parties to disarm and any planned method for the disarmament procedures; "when" represents the timeline; "where" refers to the collection sites; and "how" to both the weapons assessment process and the method for disposal of weapons.

It is clear in using this method of comparison that the Acehnese COHA neglected to stipulate disarmament procedures in some key areas. With the exception of a decision as to who would disarm and to what extent, few of the other categories were determined within the COHA; many were to be further negotiated *after* the peace agreement was signed. The failure to ascertain the number of weapons held by GAM is the first of

several oversights. Although ONUSAL did have difficulty in determining the numbers of weapons held by the FMLN, it is important to begin with at least a baseline number. Requesting GAM to provide information on its arsenal and troops adds a further opportunity for them to prove their accountability to the agreement.   The decision to have the JSC determine during the confidence building phase when and where TNI (Indonesian military) forces would relocate is also of consequence. This should be determined by the GOI during negotiations and set forth in the COHA for the beginning.

Timing is extremely important in the implementation of any peace agreement. Although timelines often need to be renegotiated, it is imperative to provide one as complete as possible. Although a timeframe for the start and end of disarmament for Aceh was indeed decided upon by the parties in advance, it was to start two months *after* the signing of the agreement. In the El Salvador case, the separation of forces and therefore disarmament began almost immediately after the signing of the ceasefire agreement. This presented an immediate symbol of compliance and confidence building on both sides. In the Aceh case, if 20% of GAM's weapons were turned in and perhaps 10% of GOI forces (if the total amount in the province is to be reduced by one half, though this too is left undetermined in the agreement) left the province within the first week following the signing of the agreement, this could symbolise a greater level of confidence and adherence to the commitment for peace than any other measure. By waiting two months following the signing of the COHA, the "shock of peace" period was lost.

The decision of how to dispose of the collected weapons was also left for later negotiation. Had the first weapons collected from GAM been publicly destroyed this may have instilled much needed confidence in both the Acehnese people and the Indonesian government that the parties were indeed working toward peace. Few Acehnese had confidence the peace would last.[53] In Mali for example, weapons collected as part of demobilisation were burned in a public ceremony called the Flame of Peace. This ceremony was a strong symbolic gesture signifying reconciliation and an end to hostilities. A similar gesture in Aceh most likely would be appreciated. The storage and disposal of further weapons collected should also be prepared for as part of the initial agreement, not to be decided on at a later date. In some places a few of the collected weapons have been used to create peace monuments or as parts of displays in peace museums. Either might also serve as a powerful reminder of the hard won peace in Aceh.

Greater inducements for GAM to turn in weapons were needed. Sources admit this was a major omission in the agreement.[54] Possibly a complete demobilisation and reintegration programme could be offered to GAM combatants as many have little money or employment. The vague promise of an election for Aceh only complicated matters, as Jakarta understood it to mean that the Acehnese would merely participate in the nationwide elections while GAM chose to see it as the possibility of a referendum. Any reference to an election should be unequivocally spelled out in any agreement for peace in Aceh. In El Salvador the promise of full political participation for the FMLN

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[53] Confidential interview 2.
[54] Confidential interview 1.

represented a crucial motivation for them to participate in and abide by the peace agreement.

The target audience of the Acehnese disarmament was both GAM and the GOI, but while the incentive to achieve credibility seems to have rested primarily with GAM, the inducement for the GOI to adhere to their side of the agreement is less apparent. Before negotiations had even completely broken down, Jakarta had already planned its military offensive in April.[55] GAM wished to continue the negotiations and had already designated the weapons collection sites, but the GOI did not want to reduce its check posts, thereby completing their end of disarmament.[56]

Conclusion

Disarmament is not a panacea. Laying down arms is just a prelude to ending conflict and in re-establishing security. However the inclusion of explicit DDR practices is often vital to the success of peace agreements. El Salvador today still has one of the highest armed violence rates in Latin America, but development is on track. The COHA's failure to settle some key questions on disarmament may have spelled its collapse from the beginning. On the other hand the COHA's disintegration may primarily come down to a lack of political will, on both sides, to compromise on and commit to disarmament. Both the El Salvadoran government and the FMLN were more committed to ending their civil

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[55] Reid, "War, Peace and the Burden of History in Aceh," pp. 14-15.
[56] Confidential interview 2.

war. However in Aceh, whether it was because of disagreement over the meaning of autonomy and elections or a lack of trust on both sides that the other would follow through with their side of the bargain, both sides were not quite prepared to take the next step. No matter how detailed the agreement is, without the political will to see it through to the end, it will not succeed.

Unfortunately, the failed disarmament process has further fueled the vicious cycle of insecurity and underdevelopment in the province. It is highly unlikely the continued military solution aimed at wiping out the GAM guerillas will improve development prospects for the Acehnese.   Newly elected Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has been sending mixed messages as to how he intends to resolve the Acehnese situation. During the presidential campaign he pledged to work towards a "safer, fairer and more prosperous" Aceh and following his election stated Aceh would be a priority his first 100 days in office. However Yudhoyono, a retired army general with 27 years in the military, who as Megawati's security minister oversaw the May 19, 2003 military offensive, has yet to prove he is better at keeping promises than his predecessors, former Presidents Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid.   Although in September he told reporters that Aceh required a comprehensive solution and military operations should not be prioritised,[57] in an interview with Time Asia magazine a month later he said "the current military operation in Aceh must be maintained; if there were to be a power vacuum, a new threat to security could arise."[58] On November 17, 2004 he

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[57] "Indonesia's Yudhoyono vows to solve Aceh separatist conflict," *Agence-France Presse* 22 September 2004 [available at Lexis Nexis].
[58] "'We Need Shock Therapy' An Interview with Indonesia's New President," *Time Asia* 8 November 2004 <http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501041108-749480,00.html>.

extended the state of civil emergency for another six months. Yet following this move, he reiterated his position to offer amnesty to GAM guerillas for abandoning their independence hopes and returning "to the big family" of Indonesia. Additionally he has offered unspecified post conflict economic assistance that would "improve welfare and education" should the special autonomy package be accepted. However, GAM seems sceptical of this familiar refrain, perhaps since Aceh was first established as a "special territory" in 1959 and again by President Wahid in 1999. Also with development projects lagging throughout the country,[59] pledges to develop Aceh sound especially hollow. For the time being it is unknown whether Yudhoyono will reopen peace negotiations, but from remarks made by Vice President Jusuf Kalla it seems clear third parties would be unwelcome.[60] As third-party involvement in comprehensive peace processes is often crucial to resolution,[61] this might spell abandonment of any negotiated political outcome for the conflict. For Aceh, peace and development appear to remain elusive for now.

Note From Author on the Current Situation (sent 12th January 2005):

In the early morning of December 26, 2004 a 9.0 magnitude earthquake located off the coast of Aceh rocked the province and sent massive tsunami waves across the Indian Ocean. Aceh was devastated. The death tolls in the province are staggering, over 100,000 with tens of thousands still missing. Although the military offensive has been suspended and a temporary cease fire has been called by both sides, the consequences of

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[59] See Edward McBride, "Time to Deliver," *Economist* 11 December 2004, pp. 3-16.
[60] Mr. Kalla stated "We don't want it internationalized again. For the negotiatons, it won't be through other countries." Powell, "Jakarta Rules Aceh Off Limits."
[61] *SIPRI Yearbook 2004*, pp. 113-114.

the long standing conflict have severely hampered emergency rescue and humanitarian efforts to the population.   The central government has completely taken over the provincial government and is tightly controlling access to the area for foreign journalists and aid workers.   Though the full magnitude of the catastrophe and its effect on the conflict and development prospects will not be known for some time (and could go either way with international awareness of the situation now incredibly heightened) initial reports paint a discouraging picture. Two weeks after the disaster, Jakarta is warning of possible GAM attacks on foreign aid workers, soldiers, and journalists and therefore restricting them to the capital unless accompanied by Indonesian military escort. President Yudhoyono has announced a deadline of March 26 for all foreign troops to leave the country and his government to fully take over all operations.

Table 1. Direct and Indirect Costs of Armed Conflict

	Development & Humanitarian Impacts	Indicators
Direct	Fatal and Non-Fatal Injuries	Homicide rates Intentional firearm injury rates Lost productivity Personal costs of treatment and rehabilitation Financial costs at household, community, municipal and national levels Psychological and psychosocial costs
Indirect	Forced Displacement	Number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) Incidence of SALW-related death and injury among displaced people Incidence of armed intimidation and assault among displaced people Social and physical welfare of refugees/IDPs
	Access and Quality of Social Services	Incidence of health care workers killed or attacked Life expectancy and child mortality Incidence of attacks and closure of health/education Facilities School enrolment rates Pupil-teacher ratios
	Economic Activity	Transport and Shipping costs Destruction of physical infrastructure Price of local goods, and local terms of trade Agricultural productivity and food security
	Investment, Savings, and Revenue Collection	Trends in local and foreign direct investment Internal sectoral investment patterns Trends in domestic revenue collection Levels of local consumption and savings
	Social Capital	Numbers of child soldiers Membership of armed gangs Breakdown in customary authority Incidence of domestic violence Family and community disruption
	Development Interventions	Incidence of security threats against humanitarian workers Costs of logistics Costs of security Opportunity costs associated with insecure environments Limited engagement areas

Table derived from several tables in *Small Arms Survey 2002*, p. 159; *Small Arms Survey 2003*, p. 131; and Muggah and Batchelor "Development Held Hostage," p. 16.

Table 2. Matrix of Variables for the Comparison of the Cases of El Salvador and Aceh

Cases	Independent Variable	Situational Variables						Policy Variables		Disarmament Provisions in the Peace Plan					Dependent Variable Outcome: Success in Disarmament
		Type of Conflict	Dates of Conflict	# of Combatants	# of SALW*	Political Situation	Gun Culture	Peace Plan	Outside Mediation	Who?	What?	When?	Where?	How?	
El Salvador	Protracted Intra-State Conflict	Political	1980-1992	GES: 60,000 FMLN: 11,000	GES: -- FMLN: 10,000 firearms, 74 missiles, 9,000 grenades	Poor; Military regime	Yes	Yes	Yes (UN)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Aceh		Territorial	1976-present	GOI: 32,000 GAM: 5,000	GOI: -- GAM: 2,000-3,000 firearms Some mortars; launchers	Poor; Military regime	No	Yes	Yes (HDC)	Yes	No	Partial	Partial	No	No

* For FMLN, these are the numbers of weapons turned in according to the "one combatant, one weapon" approach. For GAM this is the estimate of their arsenal.

Table 3. Comparison of Disarmament Provisions in El Salvador and Aceh Peace Agreements

	Disarmament Provisions in El Salvador and Aceh Peace Plans				
	Who?	**What?**	**When?**	**Where?**	**How?**
El Salvador	Disarmament: Both government forces and FMLN. Weapons Collection: Under supervision of ONUSAL	Incentives: Reintegration Reforms Elections Receive land Kind of Disarmament: "one combatant, one weapon" approach; later Goods for Guns project to collect extra weapons	Timeline for the Disarmament: Yes. To begin almost immediately after the ceasefire (Feb. 1992) and to end by 31 Oct 1992. To be done in conjunction with demobilization of both FMLN and GES.	Weapons Collection Facilities: Located at demobilization sites.	Arms Assessment: Both sides to provide detailed information on troops and weapons to ONUSAL prior to disarming. Disposal of Weapons: FMLN – destroyed GES – collected and stored All under supervision of ONUSAL.
Aceh	Disarmament: GAM – all weapons. GOI agrees to reduction in forces, and change to defensive position. Weapons Collection: On the spot, no-notice inspections to be done by HDC.	Incentives: Legitimizing GAM. "elections" Kind of Disarmament: To be decided at a later date.	Timeline for the Disarmament: Yes. Date to begin 2 months after ceasefire and to end 5 months later (20% of weapons to be surrendered each month), in conjunction with reduction of GOI forces in province.	Weapons Collection Facilities: GAM to identify 32 different sites. HDC would verify weapons were placed at sites with no-notice inspections.	Arms Assessment: None Disposal of Weapons: No provisions made.